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Democratic experimentalism, the procedural component of the “new gov-
ernance” movement, has won widespread acceptance in calling for decentraliza-
tion, deliberation, deregulation, and experimentation.  Democratic experimen-
talists claim that this approach offers pragmatic solutions to social problems.
Although the democratic experimentalist movement formally began only a 
decade ago, antipoverty law has reflected its major principles since the 1960s.  
This experiment has gone badly, weakening antipoverty programs.  Key ele-
ments of this participatory approach to antipoverty law—decentralization, pri-
vatization, and the substitution of ad hoc problemsolving for individual 
rights—all contributed to the calamity that low-income people suffered during 
and after Hurricane Katrina.  Those same features prevented the country from 
acting on the widely shared concern about poverty in Katrina’s wake.  Indeed, 
almost all progress in antipoverty law has come from centralized, nonparticipa-
tory, and non-experimentalist policymaking.
Democratic experimentalism assumes consensus on the nature of problems 
and the propriety of government action, reliable metrics for measuring success, 
the luxury of time, the lack of situations requiring centralized policymaking, 
and deliberation that is costless in most respects.  It also requires that one side  
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risk political capital to establish an experimentalist system.  These assumptions 
have not been fulfilled in antipoverty law.  Little suggests that they will be met 
in other fields either.
Further progress in antipoverty law must come from centralized policymak-
ing based on substantive consensus among many, though not all, liberals and 
conservatives.  This consensus will follow many substantive components of the 
new governance, including reliance on market incentives.  Democratic experi-
mentalism should learn from debates about deliberative democratic theory that 
have wrestled with its key weaknesses.  
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INTRODUCTION
Few could ask for a call for justice more passionate than President 
Bush’s speech from Jackson Square after Hurricane Katrina:  
“[P]overty has roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off 
generations from the opportunity of America,” he said.  “We have a 
duty to confront this poverty with bold action. . . . [L]et us rise above 
the legacy of inequality.”1  Later that month, the President joined 
many others in deeming Katrina a wake-up call for the country on 
poverty:  “What a lot of Americans saw was . . . poverty that they had 
never imagined before. . . . Poverty is . . . an important issue, . . . and it 
needs to be addressed in a significant way.”2  Similarly, Business Week
declared that “[i]f U.S. political leaders continue to concentrate on 
shoring up the finances of the country’s wealthiest citizens and shred-
ding the poor’s safety net, the poverty rate will spiral higher.”3  Secre-
tary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted “that race and poverty are a 
huge problem in the United States, and we’ve got to deal with that.”4
Republican activists encouraged the President to “confront the issue 
of poverty ‘with bold action’ . . . to lead the party back to [the] great-
1 Address to the Nation on Hurricane Katrina Recovery from New Orleans, Lou-
isiana, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1405, 1407 (Sept. 15, 2005). 
2 Remarks at the Department of Energy and an Exchange with Reporters, 41 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1461, 1463 (Sept. 26, 2005). 
3 Christopher Farrell, Poverty:  The Crisis Katrina Revealed, BUS. WK., Sept. 27, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2005/nf20050927_0544_db013.htm 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
4 Rice:  Disaster Shows ‘Ugly Way’ Race, Poverty Collide, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2005/POLITICS/09/13/katrina.rice/index.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
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ness” it had under Lincoln.5  Finally, as if on cue, the day after Katrina 
hit the Gulf Coast, the Census Bureau reported that poverty had in-
creased for the fourth consecutive year.6  The nation seemed poised 
for action. 
It was not to be.  Not only did the country fail to take any new ini-
tiatives to address poverty generally, it largely abandoned for a second 
time the same disaster victims that had already suffered so grievously 
from the slow response by the Federal Emergency Management Ad-
ministration (FEMA).  These victims were scattered to unfamiliar cit-
ies, warehoused in isolated trailer camps, and often prevented from 
returning to their communities.  Largely bipartisan bills offering 
sweeping relief to disaster victims died without floor action,7 and a few 
months later, President Bush signed a tepid legislative response to the 
disaster.  The legislation largely excluded low-income people and pro-
vided sweeping cuts in Medicaid and new conditions on cash assis-
tance likely to drive most states to gut their programs.8  Although 
much of the news media showed impressive staying power, other 
events and controversies eventually pushed Katrina’s survivors from 
5 Sophia A. Nelson, I’m Hoping Bush Can Finish What Lincoln Started, WASH. POST,
Oct. 23, 2005, at B3. 
6 See Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health 
Insurance Coverage in the United States:  2004, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CON-
SUMER INCOME 9 (2005) (indicating a 12.7% poverty rate in 2004, up from 12.5% in 
2003); Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health In-
surance Coverage in the United States:  2003, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CON-
SUMER INCOME 1 (2004) (reporting an increase in the poverty rate and the number of 
people in poverty between 2002 and 2003); Bernadette D. Proctor & Joseph Dalaker, 
U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in the United States:  2002, in CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 1 (2003) (showing an increase in the poverty rate from 
2001 to 2002); Bernadette D. Proctor & Joseph Dalaker, U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in 
the United States:  2001, in CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME 1 
(2002) (showing an increase in the poverty rate from 2000 to 2001).  To be sure, this 
sentiment was not unanimous:  a Heritage Foundation spokesman complained, “[i]t’s 
a bit unfortunate to link the hurricane with the issue of poverty in this country.”  Kelley 
Beaucar Vlahos, Katrina Reveals Poverty Reality, FOXNEWS.COM, Sept. 11, 2005, 
http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168842,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). 
7 See, e.g., S. 1716, 109th Cong. (2005) (detailing would-be Medicaid, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and unemployment compensation benefits for 
displaced people). 
8 See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, tit. VI, 120 Stat. 4, 54-134 
(2006) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)  (making wide-ranging cuts in the 
Medicaid program).  The Medicaid and related cuts alone were twelve times larger 
than the cost of disaster relief.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1932
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005, at 35 (2006) (explaining that Katrina-related spend-
ing would total $2.2 billion in 2006 but that direct spending on Medicaid would de-
crease $26.4 billion between 2006 and 2015). 
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the headlines.  Coverage of the Hurricane’s second anniversary almost 
unanimously painted a picture of governmental failure and continued 
hardship for victims. 
Cynics may question the sincerity of some of those who flocked to 
the antipoverty banner.  That explanation, however, is plainly insuffi-
cient:  the public’s outpouring of concern was so broad and intense 
that even insincere politicians should have found it advantageous to 
be swept along. 
For most of the last quarter-century, beginning with President 
Reagan’s deep cuts in public-benefit programs, activists have assumed 
that weak public support was the main obstacle to more robust anti-
poverty laws.9  The absence of any meaningful assault on poverty in the 
wake of Katrina suggests a more fundamental, structural problem with 
the dominant model of antipoverty lawmaking that this country has 
adopted.  The decentralized, participatory, and deliberative approach 
the United States has relied upon to design antipoverty policies over 
the past four decades has prevented it from developing, and mobiliz-
ing supporters around, a coherent, plausible proposal.  We have 
grossly overestimated the value of deliberation and underestimated the 
importance of achieving a meaningful consensus about the substantive 
principles of antipoverty law.  Indeed, all substantial advances in anti-
poverty law that we have achieved are attributable to a second track of 
centralized, substantive, pragmatic policymaking on low-salience issues. 
This critique of decentralized, participatory decision making goes 
against the grain of contemporary legal scholarship.  Cass Sunstein, 
for example, has extolled the virtues of minimalism, defined as resolv-
ing policy questions on the narrowest possible grounds without seek-
ing a broader substantive consensus.10  He urges “promot[ing] the 
democratic ideals of participation, deliberation, and responsiveness” 
and “leav[ing] fundamental issues undecided.”11
Even more prominently, democratic experimentalists have called 
for very much the same approach to policymaking that antipoverty law 
9 See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 65-67 (2d 
ed. 1995) (arguing that focused public attention is a prerequisite to significant political 
change); David A. Super, The New Moralizers:  Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 2032, 2040 (2004) [hereinafter Super, New Moralizers] (arguing 
that public sentiment in fact has been far more evenly balanced than is commonly 
thought). 
10 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT ix-xiv (1999). 
11 Id. at x. 
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has taken for at least the past four decades:  decentralizing authority, 
broadening participation in policymaking, expanding reliance on the 
private sector, basing future policies on what experiments have found 
to be successful, and rejecting substantive individual rights.12  In es-
sence, the dominant approach to antipoverty law over at least the last 
four decades has been an experiment in democratic experimentalism.  
To be sure, the development of antipoverty law has not followed all of 
the choreographed moves described in democratic experimentalist 
theory—it certainly has not produced the salutary results that theory 
envisions.  Nonetheless, its embrace of many major democratic ex-
perimentalist principles can provide valuable insight on their poten-
tial and limitations. 
A major obstacle to systematic evaluation of democratic experi-
mentalism has been its presumed novelty.  If few examples exist so far, 
we have no choice but to accept the case studies that the theory’s pro-
ponents identify to demonstrate its potential.  In that case, a fair as-
sessment of democratic experimentalism’s likely outcomes would have 
to await its implementation on a wide enough scale to allow unbiased 
sampling.  Moreover, the relative newness of the democratic experi-
mentalists’ hand-picked examples prevents examination of their du-
rability over time.  As a result, recognizing that antipoverty law has 
embraced the major tenets of democratic experimentalism for several 
decades can provide the means to assess whether this is the right path 
for antipoverty law and to question democratic experimentalism’s 
prospects. 
The deliberative approach to antipoverty law has displayed several 
major shortcomings.  First, it has obstructed resolution of fundamen-
tal normative disagreements about society’s responsibility to low-
income people.  Instead of establishing local processes to search for 
non-ideological answers that work, it has sustained the most extreme 
positions on both the Left and the Right even after it became clear 
that neither side could prevail in national policy debates. 
Second, proceduralism has insufficiently broad normative appeal 
to defend antipoverty efforts against their critics:  those seeking sav-
12 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 283-89 (1998) (detailing democratic experimentalists’ 
approach to policymaking).  To be fair, the democratic experimentalists insist that the 
1996 welfare law does not conform to their vision.  This Article contends that the wel-
fare law, and the prior history of antipoverty law, fail to conform to their vision pre-
cisely because the democratic experimentalist assumptions are not met in this field—
and because of the absence of means to respond to the failure of those assumptions. 
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ings to fund tax cuts or deficit reduction will not be satisfied with a 
round of community meetings.  A regime that dissipates efforts to im-
prove antipoverty programs while allowing cuts to sail through unim-
peded creates a one-way ratchet that will lead to steady erosion of 
these programs. 
Third, the lack of a meaningful consensus about the substantive 
goals of antipoverty law prevents coherent evaluation of the results of 
policy experiments:  without an agreed-upon set of goals, we cannot 
agree on what “works” to accomplish them.  Moreover, latent ideo-
logical disagreements have led to tendentious selection and interpre-
tation of various metrics. 
Fourth, deliberative models require relatively continuous en-
gagement.  That continuousness squanders the intense but intermit-
tent activity that can drive progress on behalf of marginalized groups 
such as low-income people.  Most major changes in antipoverty policy 
result from large external shocks that briefly focus attention on these 
problems and programs.13
Fifth, decentralization places responsibility on government actors 
that lack the fiscal capacity to respond effectively.  The effects of this 
misallocation of responsibility are magnified because the very eco-
nomic downturns that increase the prevalence and depth of poverty 
also shrink state and local governments’ revenues.14  Moreover, low-
income people’s mobility allows irresponsible localities to free-ride on 
other localities’ programs.  And Congress resists increasing federal 
contributions for fear that they will induce states to reduce their own.15
Sixth, decentralized deliberation comes with high transaction 
costs.  This favors those with greater resources bear the costs of par-
ticipating in ongoing debates.  Ideologues seeking to make expressive 
points on both the Right and the Left may have those resources, but 
low-income people and their closest allies rarely will.16
13 See DOUGLAS R. IMIG, POVERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF 
POOR AMERICANS 25-26 (1996) (arguing that important social-welfare policies can  
develop from episodic reform movements). 
14 See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2629-40 
(2005) [hereinafter Super, Fiscal Federalism] (discussing the interrelation between 
business cycles and state spending programs). 
15 See PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A 
NATIONAL STANDARD 100-01 (1990) (noting that some supporters of increasing federal 
funding in the early Aid to Dependent Children program sought assurances that states 
would not respond by reducing their own spending). 
16 This problem closely relates to the feminist critique of the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution movement for creating a highly discretionary system that magnifies, rather 
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Finally, seeking to establish a participatory, experimentalist poli-
cymaking process consumes the scarce political capital of antipoverty 
advocates.  Given this country’s already-tepid commitment to fighting 
poverty, that is an extravagance low-income people can ill afford. 
Some of these difficulties may be peculiar to antipoverty law.  
Nonetheless, they sufficiently parallel other areas of public policy to 
warrant a broader reexamination of the conditions under which de-
mocratic experimentalism and similar procedural models can be ap-
plied beneficially.  In short, accounts of democratic experimentalism 
to date have suffered from a single-minded focus on the regime it 
seeks to establish, disregarding both the ways in which that regime 
could be corrupted and the pitfalls awaiting those seeking to establish 
such a system.  An experimentalist movement should be tested in just 
this way:  by examining actual experiences rather than accepting un-
tested generalizations.17
Part I separates the “new governance” into its substantive and pro-
cedural components.  The substantive element seeks to replace com-
mand-and-control regulation with market-based incentives.  The pro-
cedural element is democratic experimentalism.  Through a careful 
reading of prominent works on democratic experimentalism, this Part 
discerns the crucial assumptions underlying that theory, considers the 
consequences of violating those assumptions, and addresses the proc-
ess by which such a regime might be installed.  It also identifies some 
ethical considerations that may limit the range of democratic experi-
mentalism’s legitimate application. 
Part II sketches the deliberative model of antipoverty law.  Three 
decades before the democratic experimentalists rebelled against the 
New Deal paradigm of expert regulation, participants in the War on 
Poverty were doing precisely the same thing.  Authority devolved to 
local communities, which were required to adopt inclusive delibera-
tive processes and encouraged to innovate.18  Ideological stalemates at 
the national level helped maintain and expand decentralized, experi-
mentalist policymaking on high-salience issues.  At the same time, 
however, centralized policymaking continued on low-salience issues 
and programs, incrementally and non-ideologically achieving virtually 
than dissipates, the effects of gender hierarchy.  ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 77-
79 (1997). 
17 “Experimentalism would be superfluous if its results could be anticipated by re-
flection.”  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 407. 
18 SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POV-
ERTY 109-31 (1969). 
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all of the meaningful progress that occurred.  The commitment to de-
centralized deliberation on high-salience issues did not block major 
initiatives to dismantle antipoverty programs in the early 1980s19 and 
the mid-1990s.20  It did, however, effectively prevent this country from 
translating its empathy for Katrina’s victims into meaningful action. 
Part III explores the potential of the alternative, substantive model 
of antipoverty law.  It argues that a more proactive approach to fight-
ing poverty would strengthen low-income communities during crises 
and normal times alike. 
Part IV then considers what scope is appropriate for democratic 
experimentalism in light of these concerns, seeking insight from po-
litical theory’s debates over deliberative democracy. 
I. DISAGGREGATING DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM
The “new governance” is a moniker that brings together some 
quite disparate substantive and procedural impulses.21  Substantively, 
new governance rejects rigid command-and-control regulation in fa-
vor of the flexible manipulation of incentives to motivate socially de-
sirable behavior.22  More broadly, it rejects much of the existing regu-
latory state and seeks to destabilize it in the hope that something 
better will replace it.  Its procedural prescriptions, commonly termed 
democratic experimentalism, seek to implement, but are analytically 
distinct from, those substantive aims.23  Democratic experimentalism 
19 MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
WELFARE IN AMERICA 285-89 (1986) [hereinafter KATZ, POORHOUSE].
20 MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WEL-
FARE STATE 317-28 (2001) [hereinafter KATZ, CITIZENSHIP].
21 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:  The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-47 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, 
Renew Deal] (setting forth the many different legal theories that comprise the new gov-
ernance model).  See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12 (presenting democratic ex-
perimentalism as one new form of government that decentralizes power but also re-
quires local information sharing). 
22 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 350-54 (extolling agencies’ rolling best-
practice rulemaking methods); Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 357-58 (arguing 
that a “central control-and-command structure [is] impossible” in the modern state); 
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights:  How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1019 (2004) (asserting a recent shift away from com-
mand-and-control regulation toward experimentalist intervention). 
23 Some new-governance scholars, however, seek to blend these substantive and 
procedural elements.  See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Response, “New Governance” in 
Legal Thought and in the World:  Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 471, 474 (2004) (describing new governance as aspiring to be “open-
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would shift regulatory authority to state and local governments,24 and 
often to the private sector as well.25  It would then task them with es-
tablishing a highly participatory method of policymaking, designed to 
assimilate as much local expertise as possible, in preference to repre-
sentative democracy.26  Experimentalism would strip central authori-
ties of most responsibilities other than gathering and disseminating 
information on local initiatives to enrich this deliberation.27
The democratic experimentalists’ critique of the extant regulatory 
regime is similarly bifurcated.28  To support their substantive agenda, 
they rely upon what is essentially the standard economic argument 
about deadweight losses resulting from command-and-control regula-
tion,29 particularly when regulation ignores important factors affecting 
the costs and benefits of compliance.30  To support their procedural 
prescriptions, experimentalists assert that federal regulators produce 
additional inefficiencies because they are overwhelmed by their tasks, 
buffeted by the conflicting agendas of the political branches,31 and 
operating on insufficient information,32 especially local information.33
textured, participatory, bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible, integra-
tive, and pragmatic”). 
24 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 381 (describing the Renew Deal as advo-
cating a movement of power and responsibility downward to states and outward to the 
private sector). 
25 See id. at 381, 396 (“Renew Deal governance scholarship stresses the importance 
of capacity building of private actors.”). 
26 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 328-32 (espousing community policing as an 
effective, localized, participatory method of policymaking); Sabel & Simon, supra note 
22, at 1067-68 (describing the experimentalist tendency to admit interest groups to the 
negotiation process).  Although democratic experimentalists insist that their program 
is one of “direct deliberation,” Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 340, and disparage rep-
resentative democracy, their examples often feature dialogue among representatives 
(albeit unelected ones) of various interest groups rather than among the citizenry itself.  
See id. at 324-27 (describing the experimentalist reform of family support services). 
27 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 338-39 (illustrating the need for national in-
stitutions to coordinate information sharing in democratic experimentalist models). 
28 Here again, some blend the elements of the substantive and procedural regimes 
experimentalists reject.  See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 23, at 474 (criticizing “fixity, 
state-centrism, hierarchy, excessive reliance on bureaucratic expertise, and intrusive 
prescription”). 
29 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 364-65, 388-89 (suggesting that imple-
menting policy in a top-down model is sometimes nearly impossible due to political 
weakness or ideological resistance); Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1061-62. 
30 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 394. 
31 Id.
32 Id. at 444. 
33 See, e.g., id. at 420 (suggesting challenges that a centralized system might face, 
because of regional variance in norms, in combating employment discrimination on 
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They deride assertions of individual substantive rights as producing 
“more disorder.”34  The democratic experimentalists further suggest 
that the high transaction costs in the current system—ongoing con-
flict—result from uninformed policymaking.35  To oversimplify slightly,
they suggest that we can move quickly from a Hobbesian state of na-
ture to a Tocquevillian community of civic virtue through partial de-
centralization of regulation. 
Much of the academic community’s acceptance of the new gov-
ernance can be traced to its ability to offer something to people at 
many different points on the political spectrum.  For business inter-
ests, it heralds less onerous regulation; indeed, for those business in-
terests unreconciled to regulation, it moves authority to smaller agen-
cies that are easier to influence or defeat.  Those who tend to equate 
the private sector with efficiency can appreciate the promise of new 
governance to translate advances in industrial organization to political 
organization.  For critics decrying federal agencies’ vulnerability to 
“capture,” new governance shrinks agencies’ roles in order to reduce 
the appeal of suborning them.36  To conservative deregulators and de-
centralizers, it presents an opportunity to broaden their support at the 
cost of allowing some inexpensive information gathering by federal 
agencies.37  For similar reasons, moderates fatigued with ideological 
warfare may see it as an attractive compromise, an “optimistic” mar-
riage “drawing together elements from rival schools of thought”38:
the local level); see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 279 (asserting that the central-
ized New Deal bureaucracy lacked access to useful information gathering). 
34 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 279 (criticizing legislation establishing individual 
rights as checks on bureaucratic excesses).  Remarkably, they suggest that the success 
of individuals’ claims of constitutional and statutory violations would depend in part 
on whether the plaintiffs could show that other locales had found effective ways to im-
plement the same program without such violations, id. at 288, 398-404, and that indi-
viduals could vindicate their constitutional rights against infringements designated 
“experiments” only upon showing that those experiments were shams, id. at 464. 
35 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 378-79 (praising local information shar-
ing conducted by collaborative programs). 
36 Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1064-65 (describing different patterns of po-
litical influence); see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 278 (discussing the dynamic of 
agency capture). 
37 Lobel reports that conservatives routinely take advantage of progressives’ em-
brace of localism and democratic participation by “subvert[ing] the ideals of progres-
sive social reform and replac[ing] them with conservative agendas that reject egalitar-
ian views of social provision.”  Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism:  Critical 
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 972 (2007) [here-
inafter Lobel, Paradox].
38 Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 442. 
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conservative demands to dismantle the federal regulatory state with 
continued espousal of progressive social aims.39
Some progressives have such broad faith in human nature that 
they are inclined to blame imperfections in our democratic structures 
or information failures for policies they dislike; democratic experi-
mentalism features more, broader deliberation and a new source of 
information (mediated, in all likelihood, by liberal social scientists).  
Other progressives have centralizing impulses learned from the New 
Deal and the civil rights movement and are dismayed at conservatives’ 
success in recent years at devolution and deregulation40; for them, the 
new governance promises to turn lemons into lemonade.41  Still other 
progressives fear that globalization magnifies business interests’ power 
and imperils hard-won social gains; democratic experimentalism shifts 
the focus decisively to the local,42 with the expectation that some in-
tervention will occur.  For them, democratic experimentalism offers 
the means to justify appealing state and local actions in the federal 
government’s traditional domain.43  Some also applaud its efforts to 
jettison judicial review.44  And for anyone of any stripe who is unhappy 
with the current state of national politics, democratic experimentalism 
dangles the prospect of starting over.45
This Part takes a more dispassionate look at the procedural side of 
the new governance.  Section A parses the assumptions underlying 
39 See id. at 344 (suggesting that the new governance model allows for “renewed 
dialogue between those who champion centralized top-down regulation and those who 
advocate devolution, deregulation, and privatization”). 
40 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 271-72 (acknowledging inefficiency and “free-
wheeling delegation of interpretive authority” among other criticisms of the new  
federalism).
41 It also stakes out a continued role for central government, albeit a small one, 
that may prove relatively uncontroversial with the Right.  Id. at 338-39. 
42 Refuting the popular slogan, democratic experimentalism tells us that we need 
not think globally to act locally. 
43 See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:  Constitutional Possibilities for Incor-
poration of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 245-48 (2001) 
(describing the role of state and local governments in bypassing the federal govern-
ment to advocate for international human rights). 
44 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, New Forms of Judicial Review and the Persistence of Rights- 
and Democracy-Based Worries, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 813, 822-24 (2003) (highlighting 
democratic experimentalism as one version of weak-form judicial review). 
45 See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1020 (conceptualizing experimentalist 
public-law litigation as the right to break up settled bureaucratic patterns); see also
Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing:  Deriving and Measuring Fairness in Redis-
tricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1551 (2005) (describing how democratic experimentalists 
would analyze and suggest changes in redistricting schemes). 
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democratic experimentalism.  Section B considers the consequences 
when conditions violate those assumptions.  Section C examines the 
difficulties of establishing democratic experimentalist regimes.  Fi-
nally, section D identifies some ethical issues affecting democratic ex-
perimentalism’s application to laws specifically affecting vulnerable 
people. 
A.  Key Assumptions Underlying Democratic Experimentalism 
Six crucial assumptions are implicit in democratic experimental-
ism.46  First, invoking the metaphor of a business firm whose many 
units work cooperatively toward a common goal,47 it assumes a general 
consensus about the existence and nature of a problem.48  Although 
its champions insist that their proposal does not “rest on deep prior 
consensus,”49 the business corporations to which they analogize do
have such a consensus on a goal:  maximizing value for shareholders.  
The “problem” of producing and selling widgets comes to light when 
46 Some of the new governance’s substantive precepts also depend on important 
and sensitive assumptions.  For example, Dorf and Sabel insist that in a new-
governance regime, a company that developed new environmental or health and safety 
technologies would share them with its competitors, but the authors do not explain 
how that regime would change incentives or intellectual property law to secure that 
cooperation.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 351-52.  Dorf and Sabel also assume that 
companies would want to avoid being the lowest environmental or health-and-safety 
performers enough to invest in substantial improvements, yet they specify neither 
regulatory penalties nor market incentives that would motivate those investments.  Id.
at 353. 
47 Id. at 286-87, 444 (focusing on the “delivery of services analogous, if not identi-
cal, to those provided by private-sector firms”).  But see id. at 444-69 (applying the same 
methods to the “delivery” of individual rights, such as freedom of speech, equal protec-
tion, and the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination). 
48 This assumption is quite remarkable given the democratic experimentalists’ 
embrace of a pragmatic worldview in which no agreement exists as to first principles.  
Id. at 284-86.  The democratic experimentalists do acknowledge that different locales 
may have different “initial understandings of problems,” but they seem to assume that 
these differences are descriptive, not normative.  Id. at 287.  Experimentalists also re-
port that law enforcement preferred defiance over embracing the Court’s invitation to 
experimentation with procedural safeguards in the wake of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 467 (1966).  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 460.  By contrast, scholars focus-
ing more on the new governance’s substantive program candidly admit that experi-
mentalism sometimes is little more than an attempt to make virtue out of necessity 
when powerful interests block legislation that would compel them to change.  See Lo-
bel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 395-96. 
49 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 321-22 (asserting that decisions in democratic 
experimentalist regimes do not rely on consensus any more than in pragmatist busi-
ness firms). 
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the firm determines that doing so will be profitable; the problem is 
solved when the company reaches its most profitable level of produc-
tion.  Democratic experimentalists thus assume away much of the 
normative content of government.50  They acknowledge that views of 
the problem may evolve in response to what communities learn about 
the effectiveness of their own and other remedies,51 but they assume 
that all parties agree on the ends of government.  This assumption is 
evident in narratives that begin at the point when a problem has been 
ascertained52 and in accounts of debate in which the relative success of 
alternatives does not require parsing trade-offs among conflicting ob-
jectives.53  It also is implicit in the procedures that experimentalists 
recommend, which offer those with an economic or ideological stake 
in the status quo bounteous opportunities to stall.54  The only deter-
mined opposition that democratic experimentalists countenance is 
against their procedural prescriptions—decentralization and de-
liberation55—not against the goals of government policy. 
Second, democratic experimentalism assumes that all relevant 
players are inclined to act in a public-spirited way to correct that prob-
lem.56  Democratic experimentalism assumes that both recalcitrant 
perpetrators, opposed to any effective action,57 and opportunists, hop-
ing to exploit the problem to divert regulation to serve their private 
50 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 452-53 (explaining governmental deci-
sion making as a response to incentives and regulations). 
51 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 288 (noting that the local participation and 
information sharing that are a part of democratic experimentalism could lead to much 
debate over the current political choices). 
52 See id. (suggesting that localities be directed to “publicly declare their goals”). 
53 See id. at 397-400 (arguing for a solely proceduralist version of judicial review). 
54 See id. at 345 (noting the inevitable obstructions that  any democratic experi-
mentalist administration would face).  In acknowledging the possibility of “deception,” 
experimentalists insist that monitoring and information sharing provide a complete 
response, id. at 287, implying that the consensus is so overwhelming that the few de-
ceivers cannot survive exposure.  Similarly, they concede that policymaking “often” will 
be “paralyzed by the clash of interests,” but express faith that further dialogue can re-
solve any problem.  Id. at 323; see also Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1068 (acknowl-
edging that some actors may resist dialogue but expressing faith that special masters 
can convert the holdouts).  This conclusion suggests that the clashing “interests” are 
weak so that most interest holders will surrender rather than act to obstruct delibera-
tive decision making. 
55 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 337-38.  But see id. at 343-44 (assuming that all 
candidates for local, state, and federal office will embrace experimentalism). 
56 See id. at 288 (assuming that localities will broadly join “the experiment”). 
57 Democratic experimentalists assume that interest groups breaking ranks will 
doom any systematic obstructionism. Id. at 349. 
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interests,58 will lack any significant traction in a democratic experi-
mentalist regime.59  If any such people do exist, democratic experi-
mentalists assume activists to have the political power to “revers[e] the 
burden of proof” and force the “government to prove” its effective-
ness.60  Here again, both exponents’ narratives—focusing on services 
whose continuation they assume to be uncontroversial, such as educa-
tion61 and policing62—and the vulnerability of their proposed proce-
dures to calculated abuse make this assumption evident.63  They ex-
press faith that dialogue “loosens the hold of interest by fitfully 
darting, as it were, beyond its reach, thereby discovering solutions bit 
by bit in the unfamiliar territory beyond the reach of bounded ration-
ality and habitual calculations of advantage.”64  Thus, once a problem 
is identified, the responses that democratic experimentalism offers, 
and the debates it envisions, involve only the means, not the norma-
tive ends, of governance.65
58 Dorf and Sabel note that businesses sometimes co-opt government’s regulatory 
powers to ruin competitors, but they fail to explain why requiring a statement of rea-
sons in a deliberative forum offers any better protection than having the same reasons 
presented to a court.  Id. at 392-93.  Similarly, Lobel celebrates the Workforce Invest-
ment Act’s involvement of local businesses in determining what skills training will be 
provided in a community without considering the possibility that employers on the 
boards that will oversee the training programs will seek to lower their labor costs by 
creating a glut of workers capable of doing work in those employers’ industries.  Lobel, 
Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 412-14. 
59 On the other hand, self-interested behavior, such as “gam[ing] the rules,” cap-
ture of administrative agencies, and manipulation of legislative history, plays a promi-
nent part in their critique of the old regime.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 278-79. 
60 Id. at 348.  The democratic experimentalists also assume that courts will con-
sider obligations to participate sincerely in program evaluation and deliberative deci-
sion making sufficiently specific to be judicially enforceable.  Id. at 349. 
61 James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined:  
The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 183 (2003) (arguing that the decentralization of public schools is a positive 
development). 
62 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 317-18.  Dorf and Sabel mention some more con-
troversial governmental functions, such as public transportation, public housing, af-
firmative action, and redistribution of income, but they fail to acknowledge that some 
have ideological commitments to abolishing those programs.  Id. at 317-18, 398-99, 
411-12.  Even when discussing antipoverty programs, they assume that Congress is di-
vided only about how to aid low-income people, not whether to do so.  Id. at 341-42. 
63 The exponents argue that any elite faction that attempts to stall will lose to a 
coalition of other elites and the non-elite.  Id. at 409-10. 
64 Id. at 322. 
65 Id. at 288.  The democratic experimentalists suggest that the polity can change 
the routines by which it accomplishes its ends, id. at 298-301, 319-21, but do not ac-
knowledge the possibility that persistent, powerful, well-organized forces might prefer 
no action. 
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Third, democratic experimentalism assumes that reliable metrics 
exist,66 and can be readily agreed upon and implemented,67 for meas-
uring policies’ effectiveness.  These metrics must produce reliable re-
sults relatively quickly so that the community may correct defective 
policies.  Without such metrics, local policy variations will be experi-
ments in name only.  This assumption obviously is linked to the pre-
ceding two:  without an agreement on the nature of the problem and 
the objectives of public action—including how to balance competing 
objectives—no consensus metrics are possible.  The experimentalists 
concede that “[t]here are performance measures that notoriously con-
ceal more than they reveal” and that insiders have an enormous ad-
vantage in selecting metrics.68  They also assume that under-
performing localities will seek to avoid exposure.69  Additionally, they 
note that “[m]any of those who participate in . . . ‘experiments’ will 
do so in order to advance ideas they firmly hold, not to test them.”70
Experimentalists assume, however, that all defective metrics are 
opaque, rather than skewed, and hence readily recognizable.71
Fourth, democratic experimentalism assumes that time does not 
constrain decision making.  On one hand, this means that decisions 
are not urgent:  no cost attaches to the time required to await the re-
sults of experiments in potentially slow-acting policies and the addi-
tional time subsequently required for deliberation.  Were this not as-
sumed, governments would need some means of comparing the costs 
of delay with the potential benefits of greater insight.72  On the other 
hand, this assumption also implies that localities can change policies 
66 See id. at 345-48 (insisting that localities will ignore the desire to emphasize met-
rics that display them in a positive light for the common interest). 
67 See id. at 341-42 (insisting that Congress will ignore its internal disagreements 
over the merits of a certain end in order to enable experimentation). 
68 Id. at 348. 
69 Id.
70 Id. at 387. 
71 See id. at 348-49 (predicting that local governments will provide accurate infor-
mation due to pressure from other actors). 
72 Dorf & Sabel’s selection of auto safety, id. at 357-65, as an example is thus sur-
prising.  Although the information gained from experiments might have been valu-
able, that value would have to have been purchased at the cost of additional avoidable 
injuries and deaths on the roads.  Particularly perplexing is the scathing criticism of 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 
29 (1983), from advocates of data-based policymaking.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 
362-63.  State Farm is one of the leading limitations on willful policymakers’ ability to 
disregard evidence.  Elsewhere, they declare that “the court’s task is to inquire whether 
the agency in fact undertook the kind of information organizing and coordinating ef-
fort necessary” to make informed policy decisions.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 397. 
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at will in response to evidence of success from other jurisdictions.73
No policy choices could narrow future flexibility by, for example, re-
ducing the government’s institutional capacity, depleting public cof-
fers, constructing buildings, or signing long-term contracts.74  Without 
ongoing policy flexibility, reports of successes elsewhere would serve 
only to enhance the frustration of policymakers and their constitu-
ents.  The costs of a failed experiment thus are assumed to be limited 
and manageable.75  This assumption also interacts with the assump-
tions of consensus over the nature and actionability of the problem:  if 
the norms of public policy were contested, delays in policymaking 
could shift the balance of power. 
Fifth, democratic experimentalism assumes the absence of factors 
that would necessitate national regulation.76  These include exter-
nalities from one state or locality’s actions that affect another state or 
locality,77 agency problems,78 mobile entities’ ability to threaten ex-
its79—and large entities’ capacity to bully directly80—to bend state and 
local governments to their will,81 costs beyond state and local govern-
73 See id. at 287 (implying that “error-correction” follows from “error-detection”). 
74 Dorf and Sabel focus on the safety of nuclear power plant operations.  Id. at 
371-73.  An experimentalist approach to nuclear plant design could leave some com-
munities with reactors too dangerous to operate and too expensive to close. 
75 Curiously, exponents of this view offer as an example safety rules designed to 
protect construction workers from falling.  Id. at 350.  Construction workers seem 
unlikely to welcome an experimentalist approach to finding the right standard.  The 
ethics of experimenting with these workers’ lives are suspect, to say the least. 
76 See id. at 287 (“[N]ational measures can rarely address the particularities of local 
experience . . . .”).  But see id. at 413 (asserting that experimentalism may be adapted to 
national policymaking).  Democratic experimentalists do acknowledge that local gov-
ernments lack the capacity to analyze possible solutions to their problems.  Id. at 287.  
They nonetheless believe that central dissemination of information fully remedies this 
limitation.  Id. at 287-88. 
77 Experimentalists assume that each locality’s citizens can readily assess the full 
value of its services.  Id. at 288. 
78 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 61, at 188 (equating more localized control of 
school systems with increases in schoolchildren’s well-being). 
79 Dorf and Sabel cite air-pollution control as well suited to varying local regula-
tion.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 396.  They do not explain why emitters would not 
locate in the jurisdictions with the most lenient regulations—or simply leverage the 
threat of job losses if they relocate to ensure that their jurisdiction of choice adopts 
agreeable rules.  Id.
80 Id. at 408. 
81 Id. at 277. 
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ments’ capacity,82 and the burdens to businesses operating in multiple 
jurisdictions of learning and complying with each set of require-
ments.83  To the extent that this assertion seems controversial, democ-
ratic experimentalism simply assumes that coherent national policy-
making is impossible on the very sorts of highly complex issues com-
monly regarded as core to the federal government’s responsibilities.84
To the extent that state and local governments lack the resources to 
fund important activities, democratic experimentalism assumes Con-
gress will fund them to pursue broadly defined purposes.85  The “self-
limit[ing]” members of Congress would bear the political costs of rais-
ing this revenue without the benefits of being able to point to particu-
lar activities they were supporting.86  They would have to put their 
“own disagreements to one side.”87
Finally, democratic experimentalism assumes, for the most part, 
that transaction costs do not significantly deter political participa-
tion.88  The one salient exception is information costs, which democ-
ratic experimentalists take to be effectively prohibitive absent the in-
terventions they propose.89  Yet while they doubt that members of the 
82 They assume that acceptance of their procedural prescriptions will lead to adop-
tion of their substantive recommendations, which in turn they assume to produce sub-
stantial savings.  Id. at 412-13. 
83 Cf. id. at 278 (noting the burdens on businesses of complying with different 
regulatory regimes applicable to different sectors of the economy). 
84 Id. at 270-71.  The democratic experimentalists do acknowledge that the meth-
ods they espouse can be ineffectual in the corporate world when conditions demand 
global decisions.  Id. at 310-11. 
85 Id. at 341-42.  Dorf and Sabel assume redistribution will take place.  Id. at 411-
12.  Although they acknowledge that residential segregation leaves the localities where 
many low-income people live without the resources to serve them, id. at 408, they are 
unclear about whether the resources redistributed will come from federal, state, or  
local government. 
86 Id. at 342.  Dorf and Sabel do note that, in passing the 1996 welfare law, Con-
gress neither provided sufficient funds to states nor refrained from imposing onerous 
regulations.  Id. at 435-36. 
87 Id. at 342.  Indeed, the democratic experimentalists suggest that Congress 
should pay for costly projects even when it prefers an inexpensive regulatory solution.  Id.
88 See id. at 328-29 (responding to obstacles to participation by providing an exam-
ple of a case in which they were overcome).  But see Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 
1064-66 (using public-choice concepts to explain “political blockages” that cause gov-
ernmental misfeasance).  Experimentalists do acknowledge the danger of “a morass of 
proceduralism.”  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 405.  They consider the possibility that 
the costs of participation would give a comparative advantage to the affluent but dis-
miss the idea, citing serfs’ campaigns for freedom and freed slaves’ departure from 
plantations.  Id. at 408-11. 
89 See Liebman & Sabel, supra note 61, at 266-67 (arguing that collective-action 
problems hamper information collection). 
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public will take the time to research a problem, the experimentalists 
assume that the same individuals are happy to spend just as much 
time in deliberations and other forms of community activism.90  They 
assume these activists routinely attend “general meetings” with simi-
larly inclined people from other parts of the country to compare 
notes91 and have acquired the skills to do so effectively.92  Thus, after 
taking a rationalist approach in adopting the neoclassical critique of 
direct regulation, experimentalists reverse fields to reject the central 
teachings of public-choice theory.93
B.  The Consequences of Failures in the Experimentalist Assumptions 
The failure of these assumptions does not block the democratic 
experimentalist program in its entirety; it merely renders the program 
vulnerable to being sent radically off-course.  Deregulation, decentral-
ization, privatization, and even deliberation can still occur; they simply 
fail to play the constructive roles the democratic experimentalists en-
vision for them.  Broader debates about deliberative democracy have 
identified strong grounds for concern that the experimentalists’ as-
sumptions often will prove to be unfounded in practice. 
Without consensus about what the problem is or whether it is a 
desirable object of state intervention, nothing is likely to replace the 
90 Thus, for example, experimentalists assume that transparency in the interac-
tions between regulators and regulated entities will automatically eliminate any risk of 
capture. Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 355 (discussing the adoption of 
“[i]nspection by peer administrators” as a “higher-order error detection”).  This im-
plies that, should corruption occur, activists can smite it with certainty.  Orly Lobel, 
who has called the new governance an “analytical tour de force,” Lobel, Renew Deal,
supra note 21, at 343, nonetheless criticizes a “myth of engagement [that] obscures the 
actual lack of change being produced.”  Lobel, Paradox, supra note 37, at 985. 
91 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 348.  Lobel suggests that new technology will fa-
cilitate participation, although her examples primarily involve reducing information 
costs. See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 438-41 (discussing “e-government,”  
“e-rulemaking,” and “e-activism”).  Others insist, however, that deliberations should be 
conducted face-to-face.  Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1068. 
92 But see Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 457 (acknowledging the need to de-
velop participants’ skills). 
93 They criticize public-choice theorists for “choos[ing] democracy over the Con-
stitution” while complaining that “the democracy they describe does not merit the 
name.”  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 273 (emphasis omitted).  To support this criti-
cism, Dorf and Sabel cite Frank Easterbrook, hardly a mainstream public-choice theo-
rist. Id. at 273 n.11.  Yet, elsewhere, democratic experimentalists rely on game and col-
lective-action theory, two core tools of public choice.  See id. at 352-53 (asserting that 
traditional methods of pursuing product safety trigger “a game of chicken”); Lobel, 
Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 445; Sabel & Simon, supra note 22, at 1065. 
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centralized interventions dismantled in the experimentalist cause.94
At best, the threat of blocking any meaningful new regime will allow 
strong political interests to dictate terms to the weak.95  Much support 
for devolution of authority turns out to be opportunistic, motivated by 
a desire to eliminate public functions rather than to improve or de-
mocratize them.96
Without reliable metrics, an attempt at experimentalism will only 
shift policy debates from the normative to the empirical,97 probably 
becoming even less accessible to technically unsophisticated voters in 
the process.98  Alice Rivlin agrees that “the difficulty in selecting ex-
emplary projects for publicity is that each one is unique.  Nobody is 
sure how relevant a successful program will be to other circumstances 
and other areas.”99  Rivlin also notes that “[a]nother reservation about 
the desirability of social experimentation concerns the honesty with 
which experimental results will be reported.  No one likes to fail.  
Rightly or wrongly, the administrator of a successful experimental pro-
ject will receive more acclaim and greater opportunities for advance-
94 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2006) (criticizing democratic experimentalist ap-
proaches in the employment-discrimination context for a lack of normative vision).  
One experimentalist admits to “some ambiguity in the added value of generating syn-
ergy.”  Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 384.  She suggests that either greater empa-
thy or greater ability to monitor one another may hold the answer.  Id. at 384-85.  Yet, 
experience suggests that elites are unlikely to yield power and wealth to marginalized 
groups absent a credible threat of greater losses. See ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN 
WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PAR-
TICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 3-25 (2003) (“When individuals cannot dominate others . . . 
they are often more willing to deliberate.”).  Having to hire representatives to engage 
in deliberations in which they never make meaningful concessions is not such a threat. 
95 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 460-61 (discussing how informality in in-
teractions is viewed by some scholars as “strategic powerlessness” which maintains “ex-
isting social hierarchies”). 
96 See, e.g., TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 108-09 (1998) (“Reagan consistently de-
fined federalism reform as a one-sided equation that reduced the federal role but did 
little to encourage states and localities.” (citation omitted)). 
97 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 455-56 (warning against “reliance on 
technical formulae for value-driven policy choices”). 
98 One leading new-governance scholar recognizes this risk:  “New governance ap-
proaches often assume one-dimensional measurements in evaluating complex devel-
opments.  For example, scholars may imply flat equations between advancement in 
business administration models and new public management models; between scien-
tific learning and democratic learning; between small-scale knowledge and large-scale 
initiatives; and between accountability and responsiveness.”  Id. at 450. 
99 ALICE M. RIVLIN, SYSTEMATIC THINKING FOR SOCIAL ACTION 89 (1971). 
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ment . . . .”100  “Members of this implicit league of reformers may be 
willing to gloss over one another’s overweening on the charitable 
grounds that all experiments entail mistakes or out of the cynical ex-
pectation that should they encounter difficulties one hand will wash 
the other.”101  If some types of social achievement are more difficult to 
measure, the absence of measurable results may deny full considera-
tion to proposals in those areas in subsequent experimentalist discus-
sions.  This denial violates the principle of political equality, an im-
portant precondition of democracy.102
If one policy choice becomes effectively irrevocable, the experi-
mentation will end prematurely, even if the results of that choice 
prove unsatisfactory.  Yet the provisionality that the democratic ex-
perimentalists celebrate also may become an obstacle to identifying 
promising policies:  “[S]ocial experiments may simply take too much 
time.  Many of the really interesting effects of social action show up 
only after a period of years.”103  These experiments may be ended 
early, effectively excluding the policies being tested from further con-
sideration in experimentalist deliberations.  This, too, violates the 
principle of political equality. 
If only the national government can address a problem effectively, 
all experiments are likely to “show” that the problem is not amenable 
to a local response.  This result could be misinterpreted as suggesting 
that no public response on any level would be availing. 
Finally, if participation proves costly,104 decentralization will move 
decision making into greater obscurity, hidden from the scrutiny of 
the national media and advocacy organizations that could spread 
those costs more efficiently.  Local voluntary participation proves ex-
100 Id. at 112. 
101 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experi-
mentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 874-75 (2000) [hereinafter Dorf & Sabel, 
Treatment Courts].
102 See JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR 
DEMOCRATIC REFORM 30-31 (1991) (defining “political equality” as “the institutionali-
zation of a system which grants equal consideration to everyone’s preferences and 
which grants everyone appropriately equal opportunities to formulate preference on 
the issues under consideration” (emphasis omitted)). 
103 RIVLIN, supra note 99, at 117. 
104 Failures of this assumption are likely to have a distributional skew:  “[F]actors 
that limit replication of successful coalitions among members of the middle and work-
ing classes, such as inadequate resources, leadership, and collective-action problems, 
are even more problematic for the working poor . . . .”  Frank Munger, Beyond Welfare 
Reform:  Can We Build a Local Welfare State?, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1018 (2004). 
562 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 541
traordinarily difficult to achieve on a broad scale.105  Economic down-
turns and related cuts in government spending starve community 
groups of funds at the very times when they are needed most.106  Few 
large foundations provide significant aid to community groups.107
Community groups have been largely silent as the federal and state 
governments enacted massive reductions in antipoverty programs.108
As Pablo Eisenberg has explained, “[f]ar from leveling the playing 
field, civil society appears to have acquiesced or, at worst, abetted a 
national policy that has slowly made it more difficult for many citizens 
to enjoy equal opportunities.”109  Wealthy interests then will be best-
equipped to fund and coordinate advocacy across a myriad of local 
fora.110  A process that insists on achieving consensus will have particu-
larly high transaction costs,111 making it even easier for the affluent to 
outlast the impoverished. 
In regard to each of these risks, it should be noted that leading 
democratic experimentalists disavow any resort to national authority 
intervening where the experimental process has fallen apart:  the only 
remedies they envision from administrative agencies,112 Congress, or 
105 See Pablo Eisenberg, Is it Time to End the Promise?:  The Failed Volunteerism Crusade,
in CHALLENGES FOR NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY: THE COURAGE TO CHANGE 165, 
166-67 (Stacy Palmer ed., 2005) [hereinafter CHALLENGES] (discussing how a non-
profit organization, America’s Promise, failed to reach its lofty goals); FISHKIN, supra
note 102, at 54-58 (reporting low voter-turnout rates for American elections). 
106 See Pablo Eisenberg, The Voluntary Sector in the 1970s:  Problems and Challenges, in
CHALLENGES, supra note 105, at 23, 29-30 (finding that at the time when community 
groups are most needed, they are “financially strapped”). 
107 Id. at 32 (“Most [foundations] were not interested in community organiza-
tions . . . before the [Tax Reform] Act and have not changed their priorities since.”). 
108 Pablo Eisenberg, Philanthropy Community Building, in CHALLENGES, supra note 
105, at 126, 128-29 (noting that whenever Congress was considering whether to cut 
programs that aided low-income people, organizations helping the poor said little in 
protest). 
109 Pablo Eisenberg, Looking Ahead:  What is the Future for the Nonprofit World?, in
CHALLENGES, supra note 105, at 228, 236. 
110 See Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 460-62 (“[S]tronger parties are able to 
see the benefits of a shift to the governance model.”). 
111 See FISHKIN, supra note 102, at 51 (stating that adopting the practices of a 
Quaker meeting, where the discussion continues until a general consensus is reached, 
would “raise decision-costs enormously”). 
112 Administrative agencies would be research organizations, without substantive 
decision-making authority.  Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 399 (“[T]he business of 
government agencies becomes regulatory research and development . . . .” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  One new-governance scholar breaks ranks with the purists 
to acknowledge that “retention of supervisory authority and the background threat of 
direct regulation and enforcement strengthen accountability in the shift to govern-
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the courts are directives to share information and deliberate.113  In-
deed, they declare it “most critical[]” to bar litigation outright while 
experimentation—which they consider a perpetual process—is un-
derway.114  Although democratic experimentalists describe ways that 
parties might try to be persuasive in litigation over the breakdown of 
deliberations,115 they so limit the court’s available remedies—at worst, 
apparently, more deliberation116—that it is unclear whether parties 
would care if they won or lost. 
In short, if the deliberative process cannot function effectively be-
cause any one of these assumptions is not met, democratic experimen-
talists provide no means to correct the malfunction.  Here, the experi-
mentalists depart significantly from the models of industrial organiza-
tion that inspire them:  if an employee or unit ceases to pursue the 
general well-being of the corporation, or even if the employee or unit 
does so zealously but ineffectually, senior management fires them.  No 
company would long remain profitable if it disabled the mechanisms 
of central discipline as resolutely as the democratic experimentalists 
propose.   
C.  How Democratic Experimentalist Regimes May Be Established 
In addition to the system’s ongoing vulnerabilities, the process of 
establishing democratic experimentalism in the first place may be 
problematic.  “Shifts from one paradigm to another are always about 
shifts in power allocation.  Governance processes not only provide a 
framework for decision making and action, but also alternate the 
power relations among the participants.”117
ance,” but does not explain how to integrate this power with the radical devolution of 
power at the core of the experimentalist program.  Id. at 452. 
113 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 349 (outlining the remedies that a legisla-
ture, an agency, or the courts could use in an experimentalist regime when confronted 
with an actor who does not cooperate).  Congress also apparently could withdraw re-
search funding from a jurisdiction that refused to share information.  Id. at 341.  Lobel 
suggests that greater “orchestration”—dialogue with interested parties and data collec-
tion—could remedy employers’ use of “cosmetic” antidiscrimination programs as  
liability shields.  Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 420-22. 
114 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 356. 
115 Id. at 400-01, 464. 
116 Id. at 389-90, 397-400. 
117 Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 460; see also id. at 458 (finding it “irrespon-
sible to discuss the shift from a state-centered regulatory model to a new governance 
model based on collaboration and the empowerment of diverse actors without asking 
who will win and who will—at least some of the time—lose”). 
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Some scholars assert that the new paradigm can be established 
“piecemeal,”118 but it remains unclear who would expend political 
capital to establish a democratic experimentalist system.  Advocating 
for these procedures would divert resources away from each side’s ad-
vocacy for its substantive program.  Significantly, this cost is unlikely to 
be felt symmetrically; ironically, it will disadvantage groups with more 
collaborative predispositions.  Moralistic political cultures, which of-
ten have a liberal tint, are disproportionately likely to advance “public 
interest” approaches to policymaking.119
If the democratic experimentalists were not so scornful of public-
choice theory, they also might recognize that they have created a clas-
sic prisoner’s dilemma for the opposing sides of any public policy dis-
pute.  They may be right that having both sides collaborate on experi-
mentalist problem solving is optimal for society as a whole, but each 
side will be better off husbanding its resources to advance its substan-
tive agenda, whatever its adversary may do.  If one side is seeking an 
experimentalist dialogue, aggressive substantive advocacy can allow 
the other side to frame the issue decisively in its own terms; if the first 
group is behaving aggressively, a similarly aggressive posture is neces-
sary to avoid an adverse framing. 
Democratic experimentalists respond that the potential for mutu-
ally utility-enhancing results from experimentalist collaboration dif-
ferentiates this situation from a classic prisoner’s dilemma by making 
mutual cooperation the optimal outcome for both sides.120  The ex-
perimentalists offer no basis for believing that such solutions exist all, 
most, or even a good deal of the time.121  Moreover, even if an out-
come that takes both sides’ interests into account maximizes total 
value, deliberative processes are far from the only means to achieve 
that result.  Even in hard-nosed, thoroughly adversarial competition, 
each side has an incentive to structure its demands so as to minimize 
burdens on the other.122  A single-minded environmentalist with no 
118 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 284 (noting that democratic experi-
mentalism’s “adoption might be accomplished piecemeal by drawing on the available 
precursors”). 
119 PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 39. 
120 See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 322 (“[I]t is the very practical particu-
larity of this deliberation . . . that advances the good of all participants.”). 
121 Indeed, Lobel warns that “the governance model must not accept a naïve ac-
count of the win-win theme.  Situations in which multiple interests are mutually en-
forcing are context specific.”  Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 458. 
122 Dorf and Sabel argue that including marginalized people in deliberations will 
cause policymakers to begin to consider their interests.  Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 
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sympathy for industry might nonetheless prefer to reduce pollution 
through efficient, market-based incentives rather than command-and-
control standard setting because she recognizes that the vehemence 
of industry opposition will depend on its expected losses:  for any 
given amount of political capital, she can win greater emissions reduc-
tions with a scheme that minimizes deadweight loss.  She also might 
calculate that market reliance will make her look more reasonable to 
moderate policymakers lacking a firm commitment to either side. 
An actor recognizing the value of an option that minimizes bur-
dens on other players may nonetheless eschew cooperative, dialogic 
policymaking processes for several reasons.  First, she may seek to 
avoid the transaction costs of such processes.  Second, she may fear 
that entering into cooperative processes will be interpreted as weak-
ness by other players and lead them to raise their demands.  Most 
fundamentally, imposing the most efficient, socially wealth-
maximizing option unilaterally will allow the actor to harvest the en-
tire resulting surplus, whereas doing so collaboratively would force the 
actor to share.  The single-minded environmentalist described above 
may try to achieve the greatest possible emissions reduction by impos-
ing an incentive regime with a burden on industry comparable to the 
most onerous command-and-control regime that is politically feasible.  
If she entered into a collaborative process with industry, she presuma-
bly would have to purchase its consent by dividing the efficiency gains:  
she would get emissions lower than under the command-and-control 
regime but higher than she could have won from the political process.  
Thus, even if the democratic experimentalists could show that alterna-
tive policies are always available that, by taking both (or all) sides’ 
needs into account, produce the best results for each, they would not 
establish that deliberative processes are in all actors’ interests.123
405.  If marginalized people lack the power to defeat a final decision antithetical to 
their interests, it is unclear why powerful groups would make concessions to them, 
even if forced to talk.  If formerly marginalized people do have political leverage, that 
should affect the result, whether through dialogue or through other parties calibrating 
their proposals to avoid a fight.  Exponents passionately insist that the autonomy of the 
formally powerless is vital to democratic experimentalism, but they do not explain how 
that will be achieved.  Id. at 405-06. 
123 And even if experimentalists could somehow establish that mutual cooperation 
produces the best result for all players, they cannot assure cooperation.  More pre-
cisely, assuming that each side receives the best result from cooperating transforms the 
game from a simple prisoner’s dilemma to an endlessly iterated prisoner’s dilemma.  
Cooperation does indeed become the dominant strategy in this game, but players may 
take different lengths of time to recognize that.  The democratic experimentalists as-
sume that uncertainty about the political situation will cause powerful interests to co-
566 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 541
D.  Ethical Concerns About Democratic Experimentalism 
These practical problems associated with democratic experimen-
talism also help to illustrate an important set of ethical concerns.  In-
sisting on experimentalist means to decide questions affecting vulner-
able human beings, rather than favoring whichever method will yield 
the best substantive results, comes perilously close to treating those 
people as means rather than as ends.  Although the democratic ex-
perimentalists are correct that the results of an experiment cannot be 
known with certainty before it is conducted,124 some outcomes may be 
far more probable than others.  A strong argument could be made 
that showing low-income people equal respect as human beings en-
tails a duty to apply our best efforts to estimate experiments’ likely re-
sults and to proceed only with those likely to prove consistent with our 
ethical beliefs.  A series of tragedies in which those ethical concerns 
were disregarded125 led to strict rules forbidding human experimenta-
tion without obtaining prior third-party ethical review and the fully in-
formed consent of the participants.126 Insisting upon experimentalist 
policymaking when other means are more likely to secure vulnerable 
people’s well-being risks repeating those mistakes. 
A related concern involves the democratic experimentalists’ oppo-
sition to substantive individual rights.  Although they do not provide 
explicitly for any exceptions, many kinds of rights surely will not be 
dropped.  Property owners will not lose their rights against uncom-
pensated takings even if they cannot identify “working alternatives 
that do not.”127  Courts will not ignore affluent political donors’ First 
Amendment rights just because a locality has met its “obligation of 
self-explication.”128  The experimentalists’ discussion focuses largely 
operate but fail to consider that it could do just the opposite.  Id. at 409-10.  In one of 
Dorf and Sabel’s examples, a moderate policymaker, such as former Transportation 
Secretary William Coleman, may seek to impose an experimentalist regime.  Id. at 362.  
As they demonstrate, however, such a regime is likely to prove unsustainable if one side 
or the other seizes the reins of power.  Id.
124 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 407. 
125 See generally Donald H.J. Hermann, Lessons Taught by Miss Evers’ Boys:  The In-
adequacy of Benevolence and the Need for Legal Protection of Human Subjects in Medical Re-
search, 15 J.L. & HEALTH 147, 147-48 (2000) (noting historical instances of abuse of 
medical research subjects). 
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 300gg-92 (2000). 
127 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 288. 
128 Id. at 399. 
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on equal protection and regulatory statutes that protect individuals 
against exercises of concentrated power.129
Granting judicial protection to the substantive interests of one set 
of actors and not those of another set has profound political conse-
quences.  Those whose key interests enjoy judicial protection can de-
vote all of their political capital to pursuing secondary preferences 
while their rightless counterparts can take nothing for granted.  Hav-
ing a judicially secured floor on one’s vulnerability to misfortune can 
encourage political gambling that brings rich rewards; those who 
could lose everything tend to hedge their bets more and are thus less 
likely to win transformational change.  Contemporary constitutional- 
and administrative-law doctrines already create considerable imbal-
ances in recourse to the courts; exacerbating that imbalance will fur-
ther hinder a deliberation of equals. 
II. DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM AND ANTIPOVERTY LAW
In much of the world, antipoverty policy is primarily a matter for 
the central government.  Whether conducted through broad social 
insurance, targeted need-based programs, subsidization of particular 
industries or staples, or trade policies that promote export industries, 
central officials almost invariably play a key role. 
Not here.  From its birth, this country has seen poverty as a local 
concern to be addressed by local means.  Moreover, our antipoverty 
policy is profoundly heterodox.  Our society as a whole is largely ag-
nostic as to what substantively should be done, leaving state and local 
antipoverty policymaking with broad scope.  It optimistically valorizes 
legislatures as addressing poverty “one step at a time.”130
In addition, American antipoverty policy is highly participatory.  It 
offers individual low-income people the opportunity to participate in 
determining the terms of their own relief through adversarial hear-
ings.131  It finds participation in the project of relieving poverty enno-
bling and seeks to extend that participation as broadly as possible 
through state and local governments and private charities. 
129 Id. at 323-39, 356-64, 444-69; Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experi-
mentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 299-317 (2004). 
130 Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). 
131 See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(10) (2006) (granting a “fair hearing and a prompt de-
termination thereafter to any household aggrieved by the action of the State” regard-
ing its food stamp program). 
568 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 541
This participatory model would seem tailor-made for democratic 
experimentalism.  Many of the most difficult tasks in establishing an 
experimentalist regime—weaning the country from the centralized 
regulatory system borne of the New Deal and encouraging broad par-
ticipation—seemingly have already been accomplished.  Antipoverty 
policy thus would seem to provide an ideal arena in which to test de-
mocratic experimentalism. 
Sadly, the participatory model of antipoverty law has been a re-
sounding failure.  This Part shows why.  Section A traces the history of 
the deliberative model of antipoverty law.  It also identifies a 
countermovement:  a relatively obscure trend of centralized, largely 
nonparticipatory policymaking that has been responsible for virtually 
all progress against poverty despite being confined to low-salience is-
sues of little interest to those engaged in the main experimentalist 
project.  Section B examines how diverse political constituencies com-
bine to create these two tracks of antipoverty law. 
A.  The Deliberative Model of Antipoverty Law 
Antipoverty law in this country always has been highly decentral-
ized.  For most of its history, caring for low-income people was almost 
exclusively a local responsibility.132  Apart from taking some tepid 
measures to aid veterans,133 the federal government had minimal in-
volvement until relief costs during the Great Depression threatened to 
bankrupt local and even state governments.134  Even then, the new 
federal role was largely confined to financing:  Congress regarded low-
income children as having insufficient ties to the national economy to 
justify much federal involvement.135  It further dampened ambitions for 
benevolent national leadership when it tightly capped grant levels.136  A 
modest expert bureaucracy developed, but its powers were few.137
Although not explicitly experimentalist, the law governing low-
income people also had strong scientific pretensions long before the 
132 KATZ, POORHOUSE, supra note 19, at 3-88, 146-78.  
133 Id. at 200-01. 
134 Id. at 213-18. 
135 See PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 92-95 (detailing legislative history pri-
marily concerned with providing benefits for retired lifelong workers and noting the 
lack of representation for unemployed parents with dependent children). 
136 Id. at 97. 
137 See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 326 n.23 (1968) (noting that for almost a 
decade federal officials had been criticizing to no avail the state practices that the 
Court subsequently declared unlawful). 
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New Deal.  For example, the nineteenth-century “scientific charity” 
movement split up low-income families and institutionalized their 
members with the full support of some of the leading social scientists 
of the day.138  Program designers in different cities debated one an-
other vigorously about whose approach to institutionalization was 
best, seeking to convert other localities.139
1.  Decentralization, Deliberation, and Privatization in the 1960s 
The War on Poverty changed far less than is commonly believed.  
Because of President Johnson’s discomfort with addressing income 
support directly, control of welfare—as well as the new food stamp 
and Medicaid programs—remained heavily decentralized. 
Moreover, the War on Poverty was founded on an emphatically 
deliberative model.  Its leading congressional champion insisted that 
the “solution of the poverty problem is not possible without the full 
participation of all elements of our society.”140  Its embrace of broader 
participation in the 1960s was for very much the same reasons the 
democratic experimentalists cite:  a reaction against control of pro-
grams by New Deal–style professional elites, who were perceived as too 
hidebound and insensitive to understand and meet low-income com-
munities’ needs.141  Even critics conceded that an emphasis on partici-
pation over substance in forming antipoverty policy seemed natural 
for “a society increasingly concerned with the desiccation of the 
community ties that lead men to accept and abide by the norms of 
trust, integrity, and mutual aid.”142  A prominent feature of the War on 
Poverty was the funding of agencies to increase low-income people’s 
138 See HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND AN-
TIPOVERTY POLICY 47 (1995) (discussing how the scientific charity movement legiti-
mated the concept of an “underclass” in order to justify punitive measures, such as in-
stitutionalization in prisons and mental hospitals, against the poor). 
139 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND 
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 180-86 (1971) (discussing various states’ approaches 
to rehabilitating the poor and historical shifts in trends of institutionalization). 
140 HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, WAR ON POVERTY 171 (1964). 
141 See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMU-
NITY ACTION IN THE WAR ON POVERTY 64-70 (1969) (noting that President Kennedy’s 
short-lived President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency illustrated the problematic 
lack of beneficiary participations in “elite community leadership” programs); see also
IMIG, supra note 13, at 26-27 (describing the professionalization of antipoverty work 
and its consequences). 
142 MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at 15. 
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participation in the political process.143  From the outset, federal law 
required these community-action agencies to proceed with “maximum 
feasible participation” in setting priorities.144
Soon after, however, the rise of the welfare-rights movement 
changed the purpose of participation significantly.145  In contrast to 
the democratic experimentalists’ vision of deliberation as a search for 
efficiency or the general good, the movement and its supporters saw 
deliberative processes as opportunities to pursue the interests of those 
most directly affected.  Advocates of low-income people’s participation 
in antipoverty programs saw benefits both to policy formulation and 
to the development of skills and constructive habits for those partici-
pating.146  The Ford Foundation played a major role in bringing about 
this change.147  Paul N. Ylvisaker, director of the Foundation’s Public 
Affairs Program, declared his goal was “to mobilize and individualize; 
to gather power and liberate it.”148  For a time, the direction of anti-
poverty policy was contested between the Ford Foundation, which ad-
vocated for a participatory model, and the Johnson administration, 
which focused on substantive policies shaped by social science.149
When the Vietnam War weakened and ultimately ended the Johnson 
administration, the Ford Foundation was left in a position to imple-
ment its view.150  The Left sharply criticized Johnson’s Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity (OEO) for insufficiently involving low-income 
people.151  The increasing focus on self-interested advocacy affected 
143 See ROBERT F. CLARK, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SUCCESS: A HISTORY OF THE COM-
MUNITY ACTION PROGRAM 22 (2000) (describing legislation that required low-income 
persons to make up at least one-third of the board of directors in community-action 
agencies).
144 Id. at 55-57.  These agencies still receive federal funding and are required to 
involve low-income people in an annual priority-setting process.  Id. at 22. 
145 See WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 344-45 (5th ed. 
1994) (describing mass welfare-rights demonstrations, beginning in 1966). 
146 See Lucie E. White, On the Vision and Practice of Participation in Project Head Start,
in LAW STORIES 197, 201 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996) (discussing the 
participation of parents in Head Start programs as a way of fostering parental involve-
ment in their children’s education). 
147 MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at 38-43. 
148 Id. at 39. 
149 Id. at 76. 
150 Id. at 4. 
151 CLARK, supra note 143, at 108-09. 
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the form of dialogue as well:  community organizers stressed conflict, 
not concord.152
In keeping with the tenets of democratic experimentalism, an 
early focus of the War on Poverty was improving the means of measur-
ing success153 and pressing local communities to “self-evaluate against 
stated objectives.”154  Federal officials “monitored local activities, con-
ducted audits and periodically mounted full-scale evaluations . . . 
[but] exercised little direct control over the actual expenditures.”155
The empowerment movement soon, however, foundered on the 
costs of participation.  Other pressing concerns drew most recipients 
away from welfare-rights organizations shortly after their own particu-
lar concerns were addressed.156  Ineffectual local welfare-rights leaders 
became entrenched, with collective-action problems preventing their 
displacement.157  Many of the activist groups that formed to influence 
the War on Poverty quickly “died from lack of leadership, goals or fi-
nancial nourishment.”158  Some of those that survived did so with gov-
ernment contracts or foundation grants, which often led their agen-
das away from advocacy.159  At a minimum, most groups lost the 
incentive to organize aggressively or to take controversial positions.160
The movement also lost important allies.  The decline of the most 
activist stages of the civil rights movement saw a decline in acceptance 
152 See TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 312 (citing criticism by well-known community 
organizer Saul Alinsky in the 1950s). 
153 See CLARK, supra note 143, at 78-82 (discussing the adoption of new poverty 
thresholds as affecting the perspective and operations of aid programs). 
154 Id. at 85. 
155 Id. at 83. 
156 See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 307-08 (Vintage Books 1979) (1977) [hereinafter 
PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS] (discussing the lack of stable groups in attempts to 
build welfare-rights organizations and the need to create new groups to maintain 
membership rolls). 
157 See id. at 309-10 (noting that those in leadership positions tended to focus more 
on their incumbency than the goals of the movement itself and, thus, resisted new or-
ganizing efforts). 
158 JAMES J. GRAHAM, THE ENEMIES OF THE POOR 271 (1970). 
159 See IMIG, supra note 13, at 26-27 (arguing that such organizations historically 
avoided political advocacy in order to focus on service provision); see also PIVEN &
CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 321-26 (recognizing the weakened militancy 
of the National Welfare Rights Organization as it relied more on the federal system). 
160 See PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 312-15 (noting that a 
leadership agenda to cultivate relationships with other organizations led to changes in 
rhetoric, but no incentives to act on them). 
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of participatory policymaking.161  For a time, the antipoverty move-
ment made striking gains in transforming the professional bureauc-
racy it had set out to oppose.  After initially fearing reform as a threat 
to their profession, many social workers reconceptualized social 
work’s ethics to require representing low-income clients’ chosen in-
terests.162  Beginning in the late 1960s, however, states began to elimi-
nate the professional bureaucracy, replacing social workers with non-
professional technicians in the administration of public benefit pro-
grams.163  Neither these “eligibility workers” nor the social workers—
installed in administrative roles or displaced away from antipoverty 
work altogether—took strong roles in policy advocacy.164
The crushing blow to empowerment, however, resulted from the 
very delay inherent in deliberation.  The time required to reach deci-
sions left advocates under unrealistic pressure for quick results.  One 
participant ruefully noted that “[w]e constantly underestimate diffi-
culties, overpromise results, and avoid any evidence of incompatibility 
and conflict, thus repeatedly creating the conditions of failure out of a 
desperate desire for success.”165  Then, after antipoverty advocates 
spent much of the War on Poverty’s first four years putting together a 
deliberative process for deciding which battles to fight, they learned, 
with the election of Richard Nixon, that the War was over. 
The difficulties and delays that deliberation brought should not 
be surprising.  The goals of antipoverty policy have long been contro-
versial, even among those committed to helping low-income people.166
Disillusioned participants have noted that deliberative approaches as-
sume common “good intentions” without specifying what they are.167
Although many debates focus on the effectiveness of particular pro-
161 See id. at 331-32 (finding that the external resources on which the welfare-rights 
movement had come to depend lasted only as long as the civil rights movement held a 
strong mass base and ebbed away after the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
the election of Richard Nixon). 
162 See TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 312, 345.  Some social workers even rejected 
casework outright.  Id.
163 Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:  Rules, Discretion, and 
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1126-27 (2000). 
164 See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 
YALE L.J. 1198, 1254-67 (1983) (describing the conflicting interests between the work-
ing class and liberal reformers that doomed progressive advocacy). 
165 MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at xii-xiii. 
166 For example, early voluntary antipoverty groups actively opposed government-
funded relief efforts, advocating for psychological counseling instead.  IMIG, supra note 
13, at 27-28. 
167 MOYNIHAN, supra note 141, at 39. 
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grams, the ends of antipoverty policy are also controversial, with im-
portant leaders challenging the legitimacy of any public interven-
tion.168  Many argued that economic forces would naturally eliminate 
poverty.169  Later, the Reagan administration’s “master vision as to how 
societies overcome poverty [was that] . . . [s]ocieties and people do it 
on their own, and help from government is likely to do more harm 
tha[n] good.” 170  And among those championing a public role, a di-
vide emerged as to whether it should be a humanitarian effort to pro-
tect the neediest against severe deprivation or a broader effort to re-
distribute wealth that would also benefit those with modest means but 
who were at no risk of doing without the basic necessities.171  To mini-
mize controversy, President Johnson excluded income-assistance pro-
grams from the War until after his ability to enact legislation largely 
had ended; local antipoverty agencies’ inability to address these basic 
needs led to paralyzing debates in many communities.172
As protracted deliberation robbed the War on Poverty of what dy-
namism it had, experimentalism, too, failed.  In practice, voluntary 
reporting systems faltered as local agencies found them burden-
some.173  Over time, the pressures to reduce government employment 
as well as the demands of other tasks tend to shrink the staffing of 
federal agencies assigned to monitor state and local agencies’ activities 
under federal programs.174  Congress’s commitment to experimental-
ism also proved weak:  even when most local agencies perform well, 
those with problems attract negative publicity, causing Congress to 
tighten federal controls.175  Even when rigorously evaluated local ex-
periments showed promise of alleviating poverty, conservative critics 
168 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 143, at 62 (describing the views of Senators Barry 
Goldwater and John Tower that the poor are responsible for their own condition); see 
also TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 308-09 (describing efforts to roll back the New Deal’s 
expansion of relief during the 1950s). 
169 See TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 310 (pointing to John Kenneth Galbraith as 
one such scholar). 
170 Nathan Glazer, The Social Policy of the Reagan Administration, in THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT REVISITED: AIMS AND OUTCOMES OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S SOCIAL WELFARE 
POLICY 221, 236 (D. Lee Bawden ed., 1984). 
171 MARTIN ANDERSON, WELFARE 68-73 (1978). 
172 See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE 
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 286 (1971) [hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING].
173 See CLARK, supra note 143, at 28. 
174 See id. at 169 (describing a drop in the federal staff assigned to monitor the 
Community Services Block Grant from 170 to 55 in just one year, with the remaining 
staff absorbed into the Family Support Administration three years later). 
175 Id. at 94-95, 111-13. 
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raised sophisticated methodological questions about the reliability of 
any results achieved on such a small scale.176  Experimentalism was 
equally a failure on the macro level.  The War on Poverty began with 
limited goals—the two strategies with the greatest potential to affect 
low-income people directly, income support and job creation, were 
excluded from the beginning—and a tiny fraction of the required 
funding.  It was “[l]ess a war on poverty than a minor skirmish.”177
Nonetheless, the war was widely regarded as a failure, dooming major 
state interventions in the future.178
2.  Deliberative Antipoverty Law Since the War on Poverty’s Demise 
The deliberative model of antipoverty law did not die with the 
War on Poverty.  The value of participation was embedded both in law 
and in the norms of activists.  Antipoverty activists assumed that the 
widespread sympathy toward low-income people achieved in the 1960s 
would continue to provide a solid political grounding for the pro-
grams,179 allowing debate to proceed on questions of implementation.  
Reducing policy debates to technical questions would make sense if a 
sympathetic consensus remained; the great majority of the social sci-
entists that presumably would join in these deliberations were liberals.180
The courts provided another impetus for a deliberative model.  
Although unwilling to recognize substantive constitutional social-
welfare rights,181 the Supreme Court granted welfare recipients robust 
rights to participate in deliberations about their cases in Goldberg v. 
Kelly.182  Assisting recipients in these deliberations proved an impor-
176 See ANDERSON, supra note 171, at 105-15 (cataloguing the types of biases that 
might undermine the validity of social experiments). 
177 TRATTNER, supra note 145, at 324. 
178 Id. at 325. 
179 See PHILIP S. LAND, SHAPING WELFARE CONSENSUS: U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS’
CONTRIBUTION 104-05 (1988) (describing a “positive consensus on welfare,” including 
the proposition that “[w]elfare works but it does not produce miracles”). 
180 See Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2089 (noting the liberals’ “broad con-
sensus on a basic set of social values”). 
181 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972) (“So long as its judg-
ments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of 
the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional straitjacket.”); Dandridge v. 
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“In the area of economics and social welfare, a 
State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications 
made by its laws are imperfect.”). 
182 See 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970) (holding that recipients of financial aid were 
entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the termination of their benefits). 
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tant recruiting opportunity for welfare-rights organizers.183  The Court 
also handed down a series of cases aggressively interpreting public-
welfare statutes in favor of low-income people, implicitly inviting the 
political process to engage in response.184  Like the strictly procedural 
form of judicial review that the democratic experimentalists espouse, 
the effectiveness of Goldberg and a regime of generous statutory inter-
pretation assumes the independent presence of humane values and 
depends on the power of deliberation.185  Without such values, legisla-
tors could reduce or eliminate the liberally construed programs,186
eliminating the individualized determinations that give rise to the 
right to deliberation.187  Like the truncated form of judicial review that 
the experimentalists advocate, this approach gave low-income people 
no substantive entitlements beyond those they could secure through 
the deliberative process. 
This participatory approach also proved convenient for another, 
quite different reason:  it provided a substitute for substantive agree-
ment.  As one leading conservative scholar noted, 
[i]n the short run it might be possible to pass legislation that would insti-
tute a guaranteed income for all or, at the other extreme, simply elimi-
nate all government welfare programs over a period of time and allow 
private charitable efforts to take care of people in need.  But neither of 
these approaches will work unless preceded or accompanied by massive 
changes in deeply held public beliefs.
188
Although this is true on the national level, decentralization gave 
each ideological extreme the opportunity to search out areas where its 
program could command a majority.  As each side publicized its own 
perceived successes and the perceived failures of policies it opposed, 
this regime became experimentalist as well.  This resort to decentral-
183 See PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 297-98 (arguing that the 
“objective of these activities” to address claimants’ grievances “was to expand member-
ship affiliation”). 
184 See, e.g., Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 258 (1974) (holding that standardized 
allowances for work expenses must be adequate to cover all actual expenses). 
185 See PIVEN & CLOWARD, REGULATING, supra note 172, at 306-14 (describing at-
tempts to implement more procedural safeguards for denying welfare benefits in order 
to decrease officials’ capriciousness). 
186 See, e.g., Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 211 (1985) (finding that Congress 
limited Shea in 1981 with the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1981).
187 See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129-30 (1985) (holding that recipients have 
no right to a Goldberg hearing when the state reduces or terminates their benefits en 
masse as it implements new legislation). 
188 ANDERSON, supra note 171, at 159. 
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ized, participatory, and experimentalist decision making turned the 
usual approach to deliberation on its head:  instead of proceeding 
from a shared set of values about the task to be accomplished, it re-
sulted precisely from the absence of such shared values.189
a.  Decentralization 
Decentralization appeared to offer something appealing to each 
side.  As Donald Rumsfeld and other Nixon appointees took the reins 
of federal antipoverty agencies after 1968,190 activists sought to limit 
their power by entrenching local authority.  Similarly, disliking Presi-
dent Nixon’s proposal to federalize welfare, these activists aligned 
themselves with the far right to preserve the highly decentralized wel-
fare system they had inherited from the New Deal. 
Today, conservatives such as Grover Norquist seek to shrink gov-
ernment to a size that would allow it to be dragged into the bathtub 
and drowned.191  Other conservatives blame features they dislike in the 
current system on federal involvement and see decentralization as an 
opportunity to reopen those issues, preferably as a way station on the 
road to radically reducing the overall public role.192  The 1996 welfare 
law could not have been clearer in retasking Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS):  it prohibited HHS from imposing any requirements on 
states without express statutory authorization.193
Liberals, in turn, rhapsodize about enlightened people’s ability to 
make a difference at the grassroots level.194  The abiding faith in the 
189 To the extent that the Left and the Right did have common ground, it was in a 
utilitarian approach to these problems rather than one based on defining social rights 
and responsibilities.  See LAND, supra note 179, at 31-35 (critiquing the utilitarian, indi-
vidualistic approach). 
190 CLARK, supra note 143, at 128-34. 
191 David Theo Goldberg, Deva-Stating Disasters:  Race in the Shadow(s) of New Or-
leans, 3 DU BOIS REV. 83, 86 (2006) (quoting Grover Norquist, President of Americans 
for Tax Reform, expressing the desire to “reduce [government] to the size where he 
can drag it into the bathroom and drown it in the bathtub.”).   
192 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 171, at 164-66. 
193 See 42 U.S.C. § 617 (2000) (“No officer or employee of the Federal Government 
may regulate the conduct of States under this part or enforce any provisions of this 
part, except to the extent expressly provided in this part.”). 
194 See, e.g., HARRY C. BOYTE, THE BACKYARD REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING THE 
NEW CITIZEN MOVEMENT xi-xiv (1980) (praising community organizers for resisting 
corporatist threats to democracy); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS:
A CROSS-CULTURAL THEORY OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1983) (providing case 
studies illustrating the role of urban movements in effecting broader social change); 
ROBERT FISHER, LET THE PEOPLE DECIDE: NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZING IN AMERICA
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inevitability of successful innovation, and of state and local govern-
ments’ fidelity to the interests of low-income people, permeates this 
viewpoint.195
This decentralization of antipoverty policy has persisted despite 
considerable inefficiencies.  Decentralization imposes the burden of 
redistributing to low-income people on narrow segments of society 
that lack any particular duty or exceptional ability to pay.196  Indeed, as 
proximity is the main basis on which these burdens are imposed, de-
centralization has the paradoxical effect of increasing low-income 
people’s isolation by taxing interactions with them.  Thus, a hospital 
in an affluent area, or one that closes its emergency room, will not 
have to provide uncompensated care; an employer that automates 
low-skill functions will not have to pay minimum wage for labor with a 
lower market value. 
Moreover, because the media and electorate cannot closely moni-
tor each of the numerous local interventions, local action becomes 
particularly vulnerable to capture and manipulation by special inter-
ests lobbying for subsidies that benefit themselves, rather than subsi-
dies that may be more urgently needed. 
b.  Participation and Privatization 
Both the Left and the Right also embrace privatization through 
volunteerism, again for quite different reasons.  Conservatives see it as 
an alternative to, and a rationale for shrinking, government.197  As 
Democratic politicians increasingly support human-services funding 
cuts, they find this vision appealing as well.198  This follows a long his-
(1994) (focusing on the line between the national political economy and local com-
munity organizing). 
195 See KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 354 (noting that although devolution 
“seems consistent with American traditions of localism,” local governments’ propensity 
to act in the best interests of their citizens is uncertain). 
196 Thus, for example, the federal government has required states providing ref-
uge to families that evacuated areas hit by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to pay part of 
the additional costs of Medicaid.  Families’ choices of destinations appear to result 
primarily from proximity; constructing a normative basis for imposing costs on this ba-
sis is difficult.  The timing of these burdens on state and local governments is similarly 
irrational, imposing greater burdens at just the point that these governments’ revenues 
are falling.  See Super, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 14, at 2629-40. 
197 Cf. CLARK, supra note 143, at 160-62 (highlighting President Reagan’s view that 
if low-income people truly cannot resolve their issues alone, the private sector would 
provide for them). 
198 KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 163-64. 
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tory of citing the supposed capabilities of private charity to eliminate 
public aid for the poor.199
Liberals see volunteerism as “a strengthening of democracy, a 
devolution of power not to individuals and private corporations but to 
local democratic institutions and self-governing communities.”200  Nei-
ther vision treats the benefit to low-income people in need as an im-
portant end in itself.  Yet even those progressives who embrace nei-
ther of these visions—and who recognize that the contributions of 
volunteerism pale in comparison to the contributions government can 
make—may nonetheless be drawn to volunteerism.  Although wishing 
for a more robust public response, they may feel that voluntary aid is 
better than nothing; for them, abandoning volunteerism because it 
conflicts with their philosophical preference for more government ac-
tion would neglect an ethical duty to aid low-income people as well as 
possible.
Some progressives assert that working with low-income people will 
enlighten volunteers and make them more sympathetic to govern-
mental involvement.201  In practice, volunteerism tends to be highly 
parochial:  people rarely volunteer outside of communities and or-
ganizations of which they are members, and in a nation highly segre-
gated by income, this means that few volunteers develop meaningful 
interactions with people very different from themselves.202  Moreover, 
volunteers may fall victim to misinformation as organizations seeking 
their contributions systematically tend to understate government’s 
contributions and to overstate the impact of volunteers’ work so that 
continued contributions seem more important. 
An additional factor securing the place of non-profit organizations 
in social-welfare provision, and of the voluntary sector in our model of 
antipoverty law, is fiscal:  the massive infusion of federal funding to 
those non-profits between the early 1960s and the early 1970s.203  This 
199 Id. at 137-42. 
200 Benjamin R. Barber, The How and Why of Volunteering, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 20, 
1997, at E11. 
201 Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, critics of the poor urged 
that government programs replace religious charity because they believed that congre-
gations were too easily deceived by lazy claimants.  See KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 
20, at 156 (remarking that, unlike in these earlier periods, religious groups were sub-
stantially left out of federal plans during the New Deal). 
202 See id. at 147, 165 (acknowledging the failure to spur Americans to volunteer 
time and money on causes outside their communities). 
203 See id. at 142 (noting primarily the roles of the Public Welfare Amendments of 
1962 and Title XX of the Social Security Amendments of 1974). 
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“mixed economy” of public- and private-sector involvement muddied 
any competition between the two sectors.204  If advocates for a stronger 
public role begin criticizing nonprofits, they are effectively criticizing 
government programs, too. 
Yet as both the Left and the Right call for more participation, the 
public has grown less inclined to provide it.  In the early and mid-
1990s, while charitable giving increased substantially, giving as a share 
of income declined.205  More significantly, between 1991 and 1997, 
charitable contributions to social-service agencies actually declined by 
five percent while religious, educational, and medical institutions all 
experienced double-digit growth.206  Giving by private individuals—as 
opposed to foundations—has shifted even more sharply away from so-
cial services.207  Private giving to human-services charities in 1995 was 
less than one percent of the federal government’s spending on social 
insurance and public assistance that year.208  Volunteer work also de-
clined through the 1990s—and what remained was overwhelmingly 
directed at religious and other non-social-services activities.209  Less 
than five percent of Americans contribute any time to social welfare 
volunteer activities.210  Indeed, human-services organizations often 
lack the capacity to organize and effectively apply voluntary labor of 
uncertain ability or reliability.211
Nonetheless, the participatory, deliberative vision remains firmly 
entrenched on both sides of the ideological divide and is often pre-
sented as a reason for eschewing governmental action.  Antihunger 
leader Bill Shore declares that “to transform welfare we must look in 
the mirror . . . [n]ot through higher taxes . . . but by giving of our-
selves through whatever skills made us strong.”212  The “success of so-
204 See id. (describing private charity as existing “in the shadow of government”). 
205 Id. at 146-47. 
206 Id. at 147. 
207 See id. (noting that while household donations to social-services programs 
dropped five percent from 1991 to 1997, contributions to educational and religious 
institutions rose substantially). 
208 Id. at 147-48 (comparing $1.5 trillion in federal government social insurance and 
public assistance to $12 billion in private donations). 
209 See id. (noting that religious organizations received more than twice the time 
given to human-services organizations). 
210 KEN AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 367 (rev. ed. 1999). 
211 See KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 164 (discussing “the limits of voluntarism”). 
212 BILL SHORE, REVOLUTION OF THE HEART: A NEW STRATEGY FOR CREATING 
WEALTH AND MEANINGFUL CHANGE 7 (1995). 
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cial policy depend[s] upon our personal participation.”213  His organ-
ization and its allies are trying to “reclaim . . . meaningful engagement 
in [the] communit[y].”214  A leading Protestant antihunger group, 
Bread for the World, emphasizes broad involvement, declaring that 
“hundreds of thousands of leaders at all levels and in all sectors” are 
necessary, lest “the democratic experiment . . . fail.”215
Conservative Charles Murray, who first popularized the idea of 
eliminating federal and state antipoverty programs entirely, nonethe-
less praised local and private-sector philanthropy because of its greater 
accountability.216  Making these agencies the focus of aid, he reasoned, 
would force low-income people to conduct themselves to win “sympa-
thy from the white middle class” by seeking work and minimizing their 
requests for aid.217  Others argued that “[t]he more administration of 
policies and programs is brought down to the state and local level, the 
better the people will be able to judge who is fair, who is honest, who 
is creative, and who is productive and efficient.”218
c.  Experimentalism 
Finally, both Left and Right have enthusiastically embraced ex-
perimentalism as a guiding force in antipoverty law.  The Reagan ad-
ministration in 1986 sought to make local experimentalism the basis 
of a new welfare system.219  The Texas Public Policy Foundation de-
clared that “conservative policy experiments at the state and local level 
[that] would take place without risk to the rest of the country . . . 
could save the country from a continuation of costly, but ineffective 
liberal policies at the national level.”220  Rather than articulate detailed 
213 Id.
214 Id. at 11. 
215 ELLEN JENNINGS & SHOHREH KERMANI PETERSON, BREAD FOR THE WORLD INST.,
TRANSFORMING ANTI-HUNGER LEADERSHIP: A GUIDE TO THE PROGRAM 1.3 (1996). 
216 See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980, 
at 229-30 (1984) (arguing that the increase in resources for local and private human 
services following the decrease in federal spending has led to a “more humane, more 
wisely distributed, and more effective” service-coverage network). 
217 Id. at 231. 
218 DAN W. LUFKIN, MANY SOVEREIGN STATES: A CASE FOR STRENGTHENING STATE 
GOVERNMENT—AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT 194 (1975). 
219 LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR 
IN AMERICA 193 (1992). 
220 TEX. PUB. POLICY FOUND., MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK: A CONSERVATIVE 
AGENDA FOR THE STATES, at xxv (1992) [hereinafter CONSERVATIVE AGENDA].
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national proposals, many liberals based their hopes for progress on 
the results of state experiments.221
In practice, both sides’ reliance on research can be selective.  
Moreover, even tendentious studies with fundamental, well-
documented flaws222 have proven influential and been cited by poli-
cymakers if they supported those policymakers’ normative stance.  On 
the other hand, liberals did largely abandon their long-cherished goal 
of a guaranteed national income after experiments in Denver and Se-
attle seemed to show that it reduced work effort.223  Whatever role that 
research evidence may have played in resolving particular policy dis-
putes, however, experimentalism did shift the terms of the debate 
from broader societal problems that are difficult to measure, such as 
racism, to criticism of low-income people’s behavior.224
Experimentation also played a large role in shaping income sup-
port policies.  Throughout the 1980s, most states adopted experimen-
tal work programs for Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) recipients that differed widely.225  Liberals pinned their hopes 
on state initiatives that promoted job training under the highly flexi-
ble Family Support Act of 1988226 and on major experiments trans-
forming cash assistance and food stamps that Washington State and 
Minnesota mounted in the late 1980s and early 1990s.227  Fiscal limita-
tions brought on by the recession of 1990–1991, however, prevented 
these proposals from running their full course, to conservatives’ pleas-
ure.228  Moreover, with many liberal experiments relying on the rela-
221 See, e.g., LAND, supra note 179, at 109-15 (discussing various state-level  
experiments). 
222 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY,
AND THE UNDERCLASS 82-83 (1992) (showing the implausibility of Charles Murray’s oft-
cited assertion that welfare led to out-of-wedlock childbearing). 
223 MILDRED REIN, DILEMMAS OF WELFARE POLICY: WHY WORK STRATEGIES HAVEN’T
WORKED 61 (1982). 
224 See MEAD, supra note 219, at 197-98 (“The effect was not to end controversy, 
however, but to shift its focus from the character of society to that of welfare.”). 
225 See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 62-75 (1995) (de-
scribing various projects that states enacted in the 1980s). 
226 See id. at 76-85 (discussing the law’s flexibility in allowing states to design educa-
tion and training programs). 
227 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2030–2031 (2006) (authorizing food stamp components of  
experiments). 
228 Robert Rector & Michael McLaughlin, A Conservative’s Guide to State-Level Welfare 
Reform, in CONSERVATIVE AGENDA, supra note 220, at 137, 138. 
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tively slow process of building human capital, their short duration 
meant they had little chance of yielding promising results.229
The conservative Heritage Foundation called on “state lawmakers 
to handle the problem” of welfare.230  Conservatives drew attention to 
initiatives in Wisconsin, Michigan, and other states to limit eligibility 
for cash assistance and impose new behavioral requirements.231  Be-
cause many of these initiatives began as the economy was growing, 
and because many saved rather than cost money, they could run their 
course.  Their advocates made reducing caseloads, as opposed to re-
ducing poverty, their primary focus.  Progress by this measure was 
much easier to achieve, producing a widespread impression that the 
initiatives had been successful. 
States also experimented with fundamental solutions to low-
income people’s access to health care.  First Minnesota and Vermont, 
then Tennessee, and most recently Massachusetts and California have 
announced bold plans to cover the uninsured.232  Each round of ex-
periments has been stalled or curtailed, however, by economic down-
turns that robbed states of the ability to pay the promised subsidies to 
low-income people.  Conservatives, in turn, hailed state experiments 
in mandating managed care for Medicaid recipients.233
States and localities face important limits, however, in their ability 
to experiment.  Although the research is mixed, some studies suggest 
that low-income people respond to interstate differences in welfare 
policy to a degree roughly comparable to their responses to differen-
tial wage opportunities between states:  although relatively few move 
in the short term, over time these factors affect locational decisions.234
Moreover, significant redistribution is impossible at the local level in a 
society like ours where affluent people have significant mobility.  
Wealthy opponents of redistribution can move to jurisdictions lacking 
such policies, causing the burden on those remaining to become 
229 Id. at 154. 
230 Id. at 138. 
231 KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 83-103; MEAD, supra note 219, at 190-92; see 
also Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 228, at 164 (arguing that welfare benefits should 
not be increased when a mother who is receiving benefits has an additional child). 
232 See John Holahan & Mary Beth Pohl, Leaders and Laggards in State Coverage Ex-
pansions, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 179, 185-87 ( John Holahan et al. eds., 
2003).
233 Edmund F. Haislmaier, Health Care, in CONSERVATIVE AGENDA, supra note 220, 
at 206, 206-08.   
234 PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 82-83. 
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more concentrated until they, too, find it intolerable.235  Thus, local 
programs assisting the poor effectively require virtually unanimous po-
litical support, a hurdle that most other public policies need not sur-
mount.  Interstate economic competition constrains states’ antipov-
erty policy choices as policymakers seek to improve their “business 
climate” by cutting taxes while preserving services important to the af-
fluent.236  Politicians reject policy proposals that seem to put their 
states too far out of step with others around the country.237  Indeed, 
absent a consensus about the nature of the problem, democratic ex-
perimentalism provides no basis for preferring a community that 
helps low-income people lift themselves out of poverty over one that 
gives low-income people one-way bus tickets. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, the AFDC and Food Stamp Program 
sought to reduce improper payments of benefits with very much the 
kind of “rolling best-practice rules” that democratic experimentalists 
advocate.238  Both programs had a “quality control” program compar-
ing each state’s error rate to the national average and sanctioning 
those with the lowest performance.  In both programs, this quality-
control review led to resentment from states arguing that their 
caseloads were atypically difficult to manage, making the comparison 
unfair.  These resentments contributed to the elimination of AFDC 
and nearly killed the Food Stamp Program as well.239  Rather than 
spurring improved performance, the threat of these penalties drove 
the states most at risk to manipulate the metric by removing the most 
error-prone categories of recipients from their programs.240  These 
turned out to be low-wage workers, including many needing help with 
the transition from cash assistance. 
235 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 677 (2003) (“When local polities 
attempt to provide redistribution programs and other programs unwanted by some 
taxpayers, individuals vote with their feet and move to communities where such pro-
grams do not exist.”). 
236 PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 5, 54-55. 
237 See id. at 24-38 (describing debates generated by Wisconsin’s benefits program, 
which was more generous than that of its neighboring states). 
238 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 350-51 (discussing the use of “rolling best-
practice rules” in the context of pollution reduction). 
239 David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution:  Resurrecting the Food Stamp Pro-
gram in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1298-1303 (2004) 
[hereinafter Super, Quiet Revolution].
240 See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient?  Challenging the Managerial Critique of In-
dividual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1109-13 (2005) [hereinafter Super, Efficient 
Rights] (discussing the perverse incentives created by the Food Stamp Quality Control 
System).
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3.  The Centralist Undercurrent in Antipoverty Policy 
President Nixon’s election spelled the end of the War on Poverty, 
but it did not bring an end to the expansion of antipoverty programs.  
His administration broadly opposed deliberative approaches to anti-
poverty law,241 yet it made numerous aggressive moves against poverty. 
The result of the Nixon presidency was to divide antipoverty law-
making into two very different tracks.  One track involved high-
salience issues, particularly those characterized as addressing the core 
problem of poverty.  These remained the subject of extensive delib-
erations but yielded no action at the federal level.  Conservatives at-
tacked broad proposals as creating “entitlements,” taking advantage of 
the ambiguity of that term.242  They railed against President Nixon’s 
Family Assistance Plan (FAP), President Ford’s Income Supplementa-
tion Plan, and President Carter’s Program for Better Jobs and Income 
as the products of “a small, largely liberal, intellectual elite . . . trying 
to foist on an unsuspecting public . . . a guaranteed income.”243  They 
regarded the defeat of these programs as evidence of the public’s acute 
distaste for such guarantees.244  The Left, in turn, divided over whether 
the programs were sufficiently liberal to justify the mantle of “reform.” 
This stalemate at the federal level meant that foundational ques-
tions could only be addressed through state and local experimental-
ism.  A similar ideological impasse on national health care reform in 
1994 resulted in a similar shift in the locus of policymaking on fun-
damental health care issues.245
Ideological debates over elevated policy concerns led to neglect of 
the mundane business of keeping up with inflation.  Expansion in 
most means-tested public-benefit programs had slowed or stopped by 
241 See, e.g., PIVEN & CLOWARD, MOVEMENTS, supra note 156, at 331-32 (presenting 
a series of examples of the Nixon administration’s opposition to programs grassroots 
advocates favored). 
242 See generally David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 633, 709-10 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Political Economy] (“Supposed subjective 
and unconditional entitlements are favorite targets of criticism.”). 
243 Martin Anderson, The Objectives of the Reagan Administration’s Social Welfare Policy,
in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REVISITED 15, 25 (D. Lee Bawden ed., 1984) [hereinafter 
REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY].
244 Id. at 25-26. 
245 Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., State and Federal Roles in Health Care:  Rationales for 
Allocating Responsibilities, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 31 ( John Holahan et al. 
eds., 2003). 
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1975.246  “[T]he degree of protection afforded by the safety net was 
declining in real terms even before Ronald Reagan took office in 
January 1981.”247  Increases in food stamps and energy assistance failed 
to offset declines in real AFDC benefits during the 1970s, even for 
families receiving all three benefits.248
At the same time, however, a second track developed at the fed-
eral level to address several low-salience “secondary” programs.  These 
initiatives required, and obtained, bipartisan coalitions.249  Contrary to 
popular belief, antipoverty policies enjoyed strong Republican sup-
port throughout the twentieth century, with only brief interrup-
tions.250
Thus, while President Nixon’s FAP was slowly dying in Congress, 
he prevailed on three monumental structural improvements in anti-
poverty programs:  combining and federalizing cash assistance to the 
elderly and people with disabilities as the Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) program, expanding the Food Stamp Program to cover 
the entire country, and establishing the Section 8 voucher program 
for low-income people in private housing.  All three significantly re-
duced state and local discretion:  SSI replaced three federal/state pro-
grams similar to AFDC in which states enjoyed broad freedom to de-
termine eligibility and benefit levels; the food stamp legislation forced 
many recalcitrant counties into the program; and local housing au-
thorities had far less control over vouchers than they did over the 
housing projects they replaced.  Again in 1977, divisions on both the 
Left and the Right killed President Carter’s welfare-reform initiative, 
but the bipartisan Food Stamp Act of 1977 offered benefits to millions 
of low-wage workers. 
After a hiatus during the Carter administration’s decline and the 
first years of the Reagan Revolution, bipartisan efforts to find substan-
tive compromises on low-salience antipoverty issues eventually re-
sumed.  Congress expanded Medicaid every year from 1984 to 1990; 
liberalized the Food Stamp Program in 1983, 1987, 1988, and 1993; 
provided more child-care funds in 1988, 1990, and 1993; and grew the 
246 Timothy M. Smeeding, Is the Safety Net Still Intact?, in REAGAN’S WELFARE 
POLICY, supra note 243, at 69, 90. 
247 Id. at 91. 
248 Id. at 90. 
249 PETERSON & ROM, supra note 15, at 99. 
250 Id. at 117. 
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Earned Income Tax Credit in 1986, 1990, and 1993.251  These dra-
matic improvements were little-noticed products of elite politics.  
Whenever the broader political community focused on an issue, it 
deadlocked. 
The one successful effort to legislate federally on high-salience an-
tipoverty programs that was genuinely bipartisan was the Family Sup-
port Act of 1988.252  Although commonly described as “welfare re-
form,” its welfare and work provisions did little beyond authorizing 
and funding state experiments whose normative content it largely 
failed to specify.  Its signal achievements came in lower-salience pro-
grams, particularly Medicaid and child-care subsidies.  It therefore was 
a simultaneous exercise in decentralized experimentalism over high-
profile issues and centralized, negotiated policymaking on more  
obscure topics. 
4.  Departures from the Model:  Moments of Heightened Passion 
For the most part, during the last four decades, attention to anti-
poverty policy issues of major symbolic importance has largely been 
characterized by copious debate within and between the liberal and 
conservative communities at all levels of government, and relatively 
modest local innovations that other jurisdictions rarely copied, what-
ever their results.  Pragmatic policymakers of both parties worked to-
gether quietly on antipoverty issues deemed secondary to each side’s 
ideological agenda. 
On three occasions, however, public sentiment became unusually 
inflamed in favor of one side or the other.  In 1981, President Reagan 
persuaded the public that economic revival depended on large cuts in 
taxes and domestic spending.  Newt Gingrich led Republicans to vic-
tory in the election of 1994 on a “Contract with America,” asserting in 
part that antipoverty programs were out of control and fostering idle-
ness.  And, in 2005, seeing low-income people’s extreme vulnerability 
to Hurricane Katrina stimulated a massive wave of public sympathy. 
From 1981 to 1982 and from 1995 to 1996, congressional critics 
succeeded in enacting deep cuts in antipoverty programs that con-
trasted sharply with either the decentralized, experimentalist approach 
251 Alone among these initiatives, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
was not bipartisan.  Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified in scattered sections of 
7, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).  The acrimony then focused on taxes, not the benefit expansion. 
252 Pub. L. No. 100-485 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
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to high-salience issues or the moderate elite negotiations that typically 
govern low-salience issues.  On both occasions, not only did professed 
commitments to decentralization and participation fail to slow these 
centralized, ideological moves, but democratic experimentalist tropes 
were invoked to justify the moves.  Yet in Katrina’s wake, antipoverty 
advocates were so mired in decentralized, deliberative, experimental-
ist policymaking that they were unable to coalesce around a significant 
policy proposal before the opportunity dissipated. 
a.  The Reagan Budget Cuts 
President Reagan pushed legislation through Congress that cut 
federal fiscal year 1983’s domestic spending $43 billion below the level 
required to maintain current services.253  These reductions focused 
overwhelmingly on programs serving low-income people.  Indeed, be-
tween 1980 and 1983, the share of federal spending devoted to non-
means-tested social programs rose slightly while that for means-tested 
programs dropped seventeen percent.254  Over two-thirds of the 
budget cuts affected families with incomes below $20,000, while only 
ten percent affected those with incomes above $40,000.255  This legisla-
tion terminated numerous antipoverty programs entirely, replacing 
them with loosely drawn block grants that did little more than transfer 
resources to state and local governments.  President Reagan obtained 
additional cuts in safety-net programs over the next few years.256
Decentralization and community involvement in addressing pov-
erty were central themes in the Reagan administration’s justification 
of its cuts:  “Leave to private initiative all the functions that citizens 
can perform privately. . . . Use the level of government closest to the 
community for all public functions it can handle.”257  The benefit cuts 
helped fund large tax cuts—the administration argued that cutting 
federal taxes allowed states and localities more fiscal room to raise 
taxes to support programs devolved to them.258
253 Stuart E. Eizenstat, Comments, in REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY, supra note 243, at 
28, 29. 
254 Jack A. Meyer, Budget Cuts in the Reagan Administration:  A Question of Fairness, in
REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY, supra note 243, at 33, 37-38. 
255 See Eizenstat, supra note 253, at 29-30 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MAJOR 
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN HUMAN RESOURCES PROGRAMS SINCE JANUARY 1981, at 76 
tbl.1 (1983)). 
256 Smeeding, supra note 246, at 103-06. 
257 Anderson, supra note 243, at 24-25. 
258 Id.
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In practice, this decentralization did more to conceal the depth of 
the cuts than to empower local democracy.  The block grants gener-
ally amounted to only about seventy-five percent of the prior funding 
for the programs that they were replacing.259  Even these were speci-
fied to last only for a transition period, until 1988, after which states 
were expected to raise their own revenues to pay for whatever services 
they chose to continue.260  Indeed, the Reagan administration sought 
to reduce federal funding from one-quarter of state and local budgets 
in 1980 to four or five percent in 1991, roughly the same percentage 
as existed in 1933.261  Seeing this pattern, states rallied to block the 
devolution of AFDC and food stamps.262
Although the Reagan administration happily cited research that 
supported its views,263 it ignored experimental results that did not suit 
it.  A former senior administration official noted “a fundamental flaw 
in the administration’s welfare logic—namely, that . . . [s]tudies have 
consistently found that long-term welfare dependency is the exception 
rather than the rule, and that our welfare system most often serves as a 
temporary fallback position for those individuals living at the margin 
who suffer unexpected setbacks.”264
b.  The 1996 Welfare Law 
A decade later, the first President Bush initiated a process leading 
to even more severe cuts in a thoroughly experimentalist way:  by 
granting waivers of federal rules to several governors wanting to re-
shape welfare within their states.  Many of these waivers “appear 
merely to be attempts to reduce benefits under the guise of experi-
mentation.”265  President Clinton accelerated this process, eventually 
granting waivers to forty-three states.266  Neither administration was 
prepared to expend much political capital pressing unwilling states to 
259 Eizenstat, supra note 253, at 28-29 
260 Id.
261 Id. at 30. 
262 Smeeding, supra note 246, at 107 (describing the “dismay[]” of state officials at 
the prospect of the federal government delegating AFDC and Food Stamp Program to 
the states). 
263 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 254, at 54 (discussing empirical research on the work 
incentives of AFDC beneficiaries). 
264 G. William Hoagland, Comments, in REAGAN’S WELFARE POLICY, supra note 243, 
at 121, 122-23. 
265 Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor:  Waivers and Welfare 
“Reform,”  26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 741, 745 (1993). 
266 KATZ, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 20, at 91. 
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conduct rigorous evaluations of their experiments.  As leading conser-
vative commentators noted, states and localities enamored by their re-
form ideas resisted rigorous experiments because they did not want to 
exempt a control group.267
When Newt Gingrich led Republicans to congressional majorities 
in 1994, they repeated the Reagan cuts on a much grander scale.  
Gone was Reagan-era rhetoric about protecting those in the greatest 
need.268  The 1996 welfare law repealed AFDC, transferring its funding 
into the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) block grant.  
It also cut almost $55 billion over six years from other means-tested 
programs, particularly food stamps, benefits for legal immigrants, and 
SSI for children with disabilities.269  Virtually none of these budget cuts 
had even an ostensible connection to promoting work or marriage or 
to reducing fraud; budget cuts of this nature, as a group, dramatically 
increase burdens on state and local governments.270  Indeed, even the 
most prominent lobbyist for the legislation, the Heritage Foundation’s 
Robert Rector, had earlier argued that experimental evidence demon-
strated that compelling mothers of preschool children to work full-
time outside the home, the legislation’s centerpiece, was harmful: 
It is particularly important to avoid imposing work requirements on 
AFDC mothers with children under age five.  [T]here is now a substan-
tial body of evidence indicating that separating a young child from its 
mother for long periods of time has strong, negative effects on the child’s
development.  This is particularly true for children under age two.
271
Nonetheless, conservatives presented the law in thoroughly experi-
mentalist terms.  According to four of its key House Republican sponsors, 
[an] important outcome of block grant policy is innovation.  If states are 
given maximum authority and flexibility, they will develop widely diver-
gent policies.  Flexibility yields innovation.  Through innovation, a host 
of new and potentially effective welfare strategies can be developed and 
tested.  This innovation can be seen in the welfare waiver programs states 
mounted in the years leading up to the 1996 reform. . . . 
267 Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 228, at 154. 
268 President Reagan pledged during the campaign and in his first budget to pro-
tect the “safety net.”  He sought to portray himself as seeking to improve the efficiency 
of programs rather than eliminating them.  Anderson, supra note 243, at 17-18. 
269 DAVID A. SUPER ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE NEW WEL-
FARE LAW (1996),  available at http://www.cbpp.org/WECNF813.HTM. 
270 E.g., HANDLER, supra note 225, at 135-37. 
271 Rector & McLaughlin, supra note 228, at 161.
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. . . [S]tates will also submit their programs to third-party evaluations to 
examine the impacts of their new policies.  Again, this tendency can be 
seen clearly in the state waiver programs that preceded national reform 
in 1996.
272
The scope of states’ data-reporting requirements was one of the 
hardest-fought issues in the 1996 welfare law.273 The Washington Post
reported that “[e]ighteen months after federal lawmakers dramati-
cally changed the nation’s welfare program, it is becoming clear that 
the mass of data the government requires states to collect is in such 
disarray that it is impossible to determine whether the law is work-
ing.”274  In the end, however, one highly contestable metric came to 
dominate:  caseload reduction.275  This outcome, of course, provided 
no insight into how the programs were meeting any of their humane 
goals, especially with states no longer obliged to provide aid to fami-
lies in need. To the extent that analysts considered a secondary mea-
sure, it was workforce connection.276  Positive impacts on poverty or 
child well-being were either assumed or ignored. 
272 NANCY L. JOHNSON ET AL., WELFARE REFORM HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED MAJOR
SUCCESSES: A HOUSE REPUBLICAN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM
10 (1999). 
273 Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 104-430, at 351-56 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).  Like many issues in 
that legislation, these were debated and resolved in the conference committee on the 
initial welfare bill that President Clinton vetoed in early 1996, and they were not re-
opened when Congress prepared the very similar legislation that President Clinton 
signed that summer.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 302-04 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as re-
printed in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2690-92 (describing identical reporting require-
ments in the House and Senate versions of the 1996 bill).  
274 Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, States’ Welfare Data Disarray Clouds  
Analysis, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at A1. 
275 See, e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 272, at 15-18 (“Consideration of the effects 
of welfare reform must begin with caseload reductions.”); IRENE LURIE, AT THE FRONT 
LINES OF THE WELFARE SYSTEM 253-59 (2006). 
276 See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 272, at 16-21 figs. 2-6 (discussing the increases in 
the work rates after the 1996 welfare law); LURIE, supra note 275, at 263 (pronouncing 
fears of harm to low-income families unfounded because sixty percent of adults in 
families leaving cash assistance “were employed at some point during the first 13 weeks 
off welfare” and over seventy percent had a job at some point within the year). 
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c.  Hurricane Katrina 
Because disasters rivet the public’s attention,277 they provide an 
immediate opportunity for change in policy areas otherwise stale-
mated in obscurity.278  Critics of the status quo try to seize these oppor-
tunities by generalizing from the disaster and urging the nation to 
“heed the lessons” that failings surrounding the disaster taught.279
These changes, however, are only transitory.  In the recovery period, 
secondary values—such as wealth, status, and comfort—regain pri-
macy.280  The news media rapidly loses interest in disasters as dramatic 
events give way to “prosaic” rebuilding efforts.281  The established  
order’s apologists therefore emphasize the exceptional nature of  
the disaster and try to hasten its disappearance from the collective 
consciousness. 
Antipoverty advocates never came close to formulating a winning 
response to the Katrina disaster.282  With policymaking so decentral-
277 This is not to say that that such disasters universally ennoble the public; some 
of this attention is expressed in morbid, voyeuristic ways.  See Robert N. Strassfeld, Tak-
ing Another Ride on Flopper:  Benjamin Cardozo, Safe Space, and the Cultural Significance of 
Coney Island, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2213 (2004) (describing amusement park attrac-
tions recreating the Galveston and Johnstown floods and crowded, burning tenements). 
278 Special interest groups and politicians long have exploited disasters to high-
light issues of importance to them or to gain favorable publicity.  See CHARLES E. FRITZ 
& J. H. MATHEWSON, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, CONVERGENCE BEHAVIOR IN DISASTERS  
58 (1957) (listing ways that special interest groups and others exploit disasters oppor-
tunistically); see also KINGDON, supra note 9, at 187 (arguing that attracting public at-
tention is a prerequisite to achieving political change). 
279 The lessons can be about private as well as public law.  See, e.g., Jed Handelsman 
Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict Liability:  Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of 
Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 335 (2000) (tracing the adop-
tion of strict-liability tort standards to a series of disasters, including the Johnstown 
flood of 1889).  Moreover, those seeking to teach these lessons may have policy agen-
das quite distinct from relief of human disaster victims.  See Phillip M. Bender, Restoring 
the Elwha, White Salmon, and Rogue Rivers:  A Comparison of Dam Removal Proposals in the 
Pacific Northwest, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 189, 198, 203 n.63 (1997) (invok-
ing the disasters resulting from the failures of the Johnstown and St. Francis dams in 
support of an environmentalist proposal to restore rivers’ natural flow). 
280 James D. Thompson & Robert W. Hawkes, Disaster, Community Organization, and 
Administrative Process, in MAN AND SOCIETY IN DISASTER 268, 281-82 (George W. Baker 
& Dwight W. Chapman eds., 1962). 
281 HARRY ESTILL MOORE ET AL., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, BEFORE THE WIND: A
STUDY OF THE RESPONSE TO HURRICANE CARLA 126 (1963); cf. James Dao, Louisiana 
Sees Faded Urgency in Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at A1 (reporting the de-
crease in the nation’s attention to the travails of Hurricane Katrina survivors only three 
months after the hurricane). 
282 E.J. Dionne, Jr., Op-Ed., That Was a Short War on Poverty, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 
2005, at A19. 
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ized, antipoverty advocates had no strong national organization and 
hence no unified federal policy agenda.  They frittered away valuable 
time debating what to propose; over a year later, Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly reported that “the debate over poverty is alive and vigorous, 
though mostly outside official Washington.”283  Despite the enormity 
of the problem, as well as the failure of four decades of decentralized, 
participatory, experimentalist responses to poverty before Katrina, 
that approach remained dominant:  “Cities and states . . . have in par-
ticular become ‘leading thinkers and doers’” and cities are “organiz-
ing partnerships with private companies, foundations and even low-
income communities themselves to address some of these issues.”284
Conspicuously “lacking . . . [was] the political leadership that 
could put all the pieces together into a broader, coherent plan.”285
The result was a laundry list of requests with little coherent unifying 
theme on which the public could be enlisted.  Proposals included 
changes to the Food Stamp Program even though it had been by far 
the most effective program in responding to the disaster.  Others put 
more money into the TANF block grant, despite its structural inability 
to keep money from leaking out to unrelated state priorities.  Propos-
als for additional housing vouchers made more sense substantively; 
grossly inadequate housing had greatly increased low-income people’s 
vulnerability to the storm, and the lack of housing resources kept 
many doubled-up or in cramped trailers for months and years after-
wards.  Yet the major national housing-aid programs all arbitrarily cap 
participation; although a higher cap helps more people than a lower 
one, the difference is not intuitive to middle-income people.  As a re-
sult, any increase in the number of vouchers would be highly vulner-
able to subsequent budget cuts. 
The most promising proposal was health care legislation co-
sponsored by the Republican Chairman and the Democratic Ranking 
Member of the Senate Finance Committee, Charles Grassley and Max 
Baucus respectively.  The bill would have extended federally financed 
health insurance to all low- and moderate-income people in the af-
fected areas without regard to Medicaid’s usual rules relating to age, 
health, or family status.286  The Finance Committee endorsed this 
measure, but Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and Senate Budget 
283 John Cochran, New Perspectives on Poverty, 64 CQ WKLY.  2802 (2006). 
284 Id. at 2802-03. 
285 Id. at 2804. 
286 S. 1716, 109th Cong. 102 (2005). 
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Chairman Judd Gregg prevented it from coming to the floor.  They 
feared its expressive value as a precedent for national health insur-
ance.287  Although health care advocacy groups supported the 
Grassley-Baucus bill, no broad movement came to its aid. 
B.  Political Sources of Antipoverty Law 
The pattern of antipoverty law development is complex.  It oper-
ates on two sharply contrasting tracks:  a centralized, negotiated, sub-
stance-oriented, non-ideological track that has produced significant 
advances on low-salience issues, and a democratic experimentalist 
track for high-salience issues that has been effectively stalemated 
along ideological lines.  Unusual circumstances that temporarily 
strengthen foes of antipoverty programs can lead to high-salience cuts, 
often justified in democratic experimentalist terms.  As the prior sec-
tion demonstrated, however, surges in public sympathy for low-
income people do not lead to corresponding program expansion. 
This process’s peculiar characteristics spring from the peculiar 
constellation of interests and motivations of the participants.  Subsec-
tion 1 examines the major groups commonly supporting antipoverty 
programs.  Subsection 2 considers those often regarded as foes of 
these programs.  And subsection 3 explains how these groups’ inter-
ests converge to produce this two-track process and the one-sided de-
partures from it. 
1.  Major Forces Supporting Antipoverty Programs 
To endure, any policy regime allocating significant resources must 
provide value to a group of people with sufficient political capital to 
sustain it.  That value need not be purely avaricious; some people de-
rive great pleasure from seeing their vision of a proper society imple-
mented even if it does not benefit them tangibly. 
The obvious constituency for antipoverty programs is the low-
income beneficiary population.  In practice, however, low-income 
people have lacked sufficient political strength to sustain these pro-
grams.  Despite occasional organizing campaigns, low-income people 
287 Cf. 151 CONG. REC. S10578-79 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2005) (letter from Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs. to Sen. William H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate) (ex-
pressing the Bush administration’s opposition to the “massive new Federal program” 
being considered). 
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vote at relatively low rates.288  They also have relatively weak group 
identification:  their votes may easily be driven by issues other than an-
tipoverty policy, either because they do not expect to remain poor or 
because they blame themselves for their situation.  By definition, they 
cannot afford meaningful political contributions.  Because this coun-
try has recognized few positive rights for low-income people, the 
group lacks the leverage that the ability to release claims can provide.  
Moreover, many welfare-rights organizations have taken positions so 
extreme that they have effectively excluded themselves from policy de-
bates.  Whether out of discomfort or paternalism, their allies have 
hesitated to speak candidly with them about political realities. 
As a result, antipoverty programs depend heavily on support from 
people too affluent to qualify for them.  These supporters’ motives fall 
into several categories, each with quite different consequences. 
a.  Humanitarians 
Some people simply empathize with human suffering.  Others 
base their humanitarianism on developed moral theories.  For exam-
ple, religious and other moral codes charge individuals, and society at 
large, with responsibility for preventing suffering.289  Preventing ex-
treme suffering is a minimum requirement of many conceptions of 
distributive justice and may be essential for democratic processes to 
function well.  Although few associate humanitarian attitudes with 
utilitarianism, some normative public-choice theory postulates that 
ethical voters will equally value their own utility and that of others, 
causing them to support redistribution that benefits the typical recipi-
ent more than it decreases their own well-being.290
The political process can respond to ethically based preferences 
just as it can respond to self-interested ones, but these two kinds of 
aims differ in important practical ways.291  Milk producers’, steel work-
ers’, or gun enthusiasts’ demands on the political system reflect their 
direct knowledge and constantly occupy their minds.  Middle-class 
supporters of antipoverty programs, by contrast, may have little direct 
288 FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON’T VOTE 4 
(1st paperback ed. 1989). 
289 See, e.g., LAND, supra note 179, at 31-35 (comparing modern Catholic social 
thought’s concern “for the growth and improvement of the social order as a whole” 
with liberalism’s and conservatism’s views of the common good). 
290 MUELLER, supra note 235, at 570. 
291 Id. at 49-52. 
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knowledge of either the nature or the extent of low-income people’s 
travails.  Rent-seeking interest groups presumably understand the 
benefits they receive, whether from one source or twenty; politicians 
are unlikely to fool them by creating insignificant or inaccessible pro-
grams.  By contrast, low-income people’s middle-income sympathizers 
are likely to be bewildered by a proliferation of programs and overes-
timate what society is already doing.292
Humanitarian support for antipoverty programs thus tends to be 
quite episodic.  Humanitarians may be distracted easily by other pub-
lic interest commitments or by more self-serving pursuits.  And assis-
tance to low-income people can be seen as a public good.  As a result, 
because everyone can be said to benefit when poverty is relieved 
whether or not they contributed to the effort, free riders will keep 
nongovernmental relief efforts small.293
In addition, altruistic advocates of antipoverty programs often 
hold visions of the public interest that make them unreliable champi-
ons.  In particular, they may have a cross-cutting vision of “good gov-
ernment” that makes them reluctant to log-roll to advance antipoverty 
programs’ interests.294  Their sense of “good government” also can 
make altruists more responsive than most to calls for shared sacrifice 
for fiscal rectitude.  For example, antipoverty programs bore a grossly 
disproportionate share of cuts in both Democratic and Republican 
balanced budget plans of 1995–1996, with little public controversy.  
The divided loyalties of altruistic supporters of antipoverty programs 
increase these programs’ vulnerability to large cuts in times of deficit 
while providing no corresponding advantage in times of surplus. 
b.  Social Insurers 
Some people whose current means suffice to preclude their quali-
fication for antipoverty programs fear they may need aid in the future.  
These concerns have had uneven effects.  On the one hand, social in-
292 Super, Political Economy, supra note 242, at 696-705 (describing nonrecipients’ 
difficulties comprehending the true nature of public-benefit programs). 
293 See MUELLER, supra note 235, at 47-49 (arguing for a government redistribution 
program rather than a purely voluntary, charitable approach because of the free-rider 
problem). 
294 One of the most successful antipoverty programs, the Food Stamp Program, 
has advanced in part because its supporters held no such compunctions, tying their 
fate to that of subsidies for corporate farms that are difficult to defend on the merits. 
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surance, along with closely associated means-tested programs,295 has 
established an income floor for most of the elderly, a large fraction of 
persons with disabilities, and a significantly smaller share of the re-
cently unemployed.  Conservative challenges to Social Security and 
Medicare failed because middle-income people can imagine them-
selves needing assistance in age and infirmity.  On the other hand, as-
saults on unemployment insurance have fared better as fewer middle-
income voters envision themselves becoming unemployed for signifi-
cant periods.296
The social insurance approach, however, has provided little trac-
tion for dealing with chronic poverty because middle-class people 
cannot imagine themselves facing that need.  Universalizing antipov-
erty programs would radically increase their costs while doing little to 
broaden their appeal.  Efforts to persuade middle-income voters that 
government should provide them with “food security” in the same way 
it provides Social Security—hence that school meals should be free to 
all children—collapsed of their own weight when predictably few 
middle-class voters proved insecure about their access to food. 
c.  Redistributionists 
Some progressives are not satisfied with relieving severe depriva-
tion and seek to reduce wealth inequalities more generally.297  Al-
though antipoverty programs advance this agenda, this country’s resis-
tance to European-style social support has hampered efforts to 
significantly expand eligibility for those programs.  Accordingly, redis-
tributionists have focused more on tax policy and regulatory transfers, 
such as labor law and tariffs.  Opponents sometimes seek to discredit 
antipoverty programs by associating them with redistributionists. 
295 Although SSI is not social insurance under most definitions, in operating it the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) relies significantly on eligibility decisions made 
for Social Security Disability Insurance.  Similarly, Medicaid is means-tested but oper-
ates as a Medicare supplement for the elderly and those persons with disabilities that 
receive Medicare.  Congress designed the means test for Medicaid’s nursing-home 
component to allow large numbers of middle-income people to receive care once 
Medicare’s modest nursing-care benefit runs out. 
296 CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 136-37 (1997). 
297 See REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POV-
ERTY 140-42 (1997) (comparing the United States’s wealth-transfer systems unfavorably 
with those of other Western nations); MARTIN CARNOY & DEREK SHEARER, ECONOMIC 
DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1980S, at 334-43 (1980) (advocating the use of 
social-welfare policy to reduce inequality). 
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d.  Providers 
Some people have direct interests in antipoverty programs despite 
being ineligible for their benefits.  Builders want contracts for housing 
projects, hospitals and nursing homes want reimbursement for their 
services, and so on.  Even some of those engaged in volunteerism want 
their work subsidized, for example with government food to distribute 
at church pantries.  Some groups receive funding to advocate for an-
tipoverty policy. 
Just as often, however, providers start competing with the pro-
grams’ beneficiaries for resources—as farm interests do with nutrition 
programs298 and homebuilders do with housing vouchers—or warp the 
programs’ priorities to meet their own interests.  In addition, some 
providers derive little enough income from antipoverty programs that 
they may ignore all but the most important decisions. 
e.  Instrumentalists 
Some see antipoverty programs as avoiding negative externalities 
such as crime, infectious diseases, visible homelessness, and hungry 
children disrupting classrooms.  Before 1989, some saw ameliorating 
poverty as crucial to propaganda struggles with communism.299
Instrumentalists, however, can be unreliable.  Other means, albeit 
sometimes repressive ones, can provide easier remedies for some 
problems.  And the kinds of benefits they seek are generally public 
goods, with the attendant risks of free-riding.  Moreover, antipoverty 
programs’ opponents find instrumentalists relatively easy to dissuade 
with empirical evidence casting programs’ effectiveness into doubt. 
f.  Liberal Expressivists 
Many liberals use antipoverty policy for expressive purposes.300  In 
a sense, expressivists are another type of instrumentalist.  Some seek 
governmental endorsement of a substantive message:  an economic 
message involving redistribution or a social message.  Others’ values 
are process-oriented, such as those that won broad participation re-
quirements in War on Poverty programs.  With the National Welfare 
Rights Organization’s collapse in the early 1970s and persistent diffi-
298 Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 239, at 1383 n.480. 
299 Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2075 n.138. 
300 Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 239, at 1273-83. 
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culties organizing successors, low-income people’s direct participation 
in policy deliberations is easiest to arrange on the local level.  This 
aligns many liberal procedural expressivists with the democratic  
experimentalists. 
Improving the well-being of low-income people, and of the society 
to which they belong, may provide insufficient motivation to engage 
expressivists in debates over antipoverty policy.  When liberal substan-
tive expressivists participate, they drive the liberal policy agenda to the 
left.  They may be unwilling to accept anything less than their ideal set 
of policies:  they may feel that the expressive costs of a compromise 
exceed the benefits that it could bring even in situations where most 
groups advocating out of self-interest would find a deal advantageous.  
They may feel that programs modest enough to have any political 
chance of success—modest enough to represent the irreducible cost 
of indisputable necessities and to placate concerns about moral haz-
ard—would send little expressive message.  Expressivists often seek to 
shame more moderate antipoverty advocates, blocking potential 
agreements with conservatives.  And because messages can be sent 
through many different kinds of policy, they tend to drift in and out 
of antipoverty debates. 
Even more moderate expressivists may be more committed to 
movement in a positive direction—to having society “do something”—
than to any particular set of substantive results.  They may regard pov-
erty as an intractable problem but nonetheless balk at the expressive 
implications of ignoring it.  As a result, they may not be as demanding 
about the efficiency of the expenditure of the funds they secure.  In-
deed, some may satisfy their desire to “do something” with private 
charitable efforts, making them less dogged advocates for public anti-
poverty funding. 
2.  Antipoverty Programs’ Critics 
Most opposition to antipoverty programs falls into three catego-
ries:  instrumental, fiscal, and expressive.  Economic conservatives ob-
ject on instrumental grounds to many aspects of antipoverty pro-
grams:  perceived insufficient incentives to work and marry, arbitrary 
differences in the treatment of comparably impoverished people, the 
multiplicity of programs, and the failure to target funds to the poor-
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est.301  Although some support devolution, others criticize the incen-
tives to migrate that differential welfare policies can create.302
The cost of antipoverty programs also produces opposition.  
Those with other fiscal priorities—other spending programs, tax cuts, 
or deficit reduction—may oppose antipoverty spending programs.  
Those subject to regulatory redistributions, such as low-wage employ-
ers or landlords, may oppose minimum wages or rent controls.  The 
activity of these opponents is likely to depend on the amount of re-
sources that antipoverty programs are redistributing and the relative 
vulnerability of other potential sources for similar amounts of re-
sources.
Finally, conservatives, like liberals, often seek to make expressive 
points through antipoverty law.  Here, too, the expression can be sub-
stantive or procedural.  Substantive expressivists may see cutting or 
eliminating an antipoverty program as making a statement about the 
proper size of government or the importance of an unregulated mar-
ket without arousing the kind of opposition that an assault on farm 
price supports would bring.  Moral statements have become increas-
ingly common:  “new moralizers” can impose restrictions on low-in-
come families through eligibility conditions that could never be im-
posed on the middle class.303
The conservative procedural expressivist agenda involves shifting 
functions to lower levels of government or to the private sector.304
Here again, symbolic achievements devolving antipoverty programs 
are easier than devolving or selling off national parks prized by more 
affluent voters.  Devolution and privatization can work at cross-
purposes with substantive objectives—expressive or otherwise305—but 
301 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATE-
MENT 107-08 (1980). 
302 See, e.g., id.
303 See Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2051-53 (“[T]he new moralizers have 
called for objective determinations of morality based on arbitrary per se standards.  
These standards typically have little to do with the actual state of mind of the individu-
als being judged, but the inferences they draw are likely to seem plausible to middle-
class policymakers, reporters, and voters that have little contact with the judged indi-
viduals.” (citation omitted)). 
304 See David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV.
393, 395-98 (2008) [hereinafter Super, Privatization] (finding the movement to privat-
ize public-benefit administration to be motivated more by ideology than probable  
results).
305 Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare:  How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and 
Privatization Subverted Federal Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 598-99 (2004) 
(“[S]tate, church, and private welfare vendors may exploit their discretionary authority 
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conservative procedural expressivists typically have not objected to 
substantive conditions on devolution. 
Like their liberal counterparts, conservative expressivists often 
have little interest in half-measures and often shame more moderate 
colleagues.  They also may drift away to act on opportunities in other 
policy areas.  On the other hand, they enjoy two key advantages over 
liberal expressivists:  their wholly substantive orientation allows them 
to seize opportunities decisively without the time-consuming delibera-
tions that liberals prize, and their desired policies generally are in-
expensive, freeing them from competition for scarce public resources. 
3.  Origins of Democratic Experimentalism in Antipoverty Law 
The diversity, and often frailty, of interests among supporters of 
antipoverty programs undermines their effectiveness relative to other 
competitors for public funds.  It also contributes to the peculiar two-
track mechanism by which antipoverty policy is made.  In particular, 
expressivists on both ends of the political spectrum drive the process 
toward democratic experimentalism.  Conservative procedural expres-
sivists favor decentralization on its merits; liberal procedural ex-
pressivists find local and state governments, and private nonprofits, 
the venues best suited to the participatory, deliberative mode of deci-
sion making they favor; and substantive expressivists on both wings 
have far better chances of finding ideologically skewed localities re-
ceptive to their proposals than they do of prevailing nationally.  Simi-
larly, social insurers and redistributionists have little reason to partici-
pate in national policy debates that can only bear fruit through 
compromise with conservatives staunchly opposed to their views.  
Some liberal advocacy groups also may find it easier to raise funds for 
a continual series of local battles than for preparatory work during 
lulls in national attention to poverty.  On the other wing, fiscal oppo-
nents of antipoverty programs may feel at less risk because state and 
local revenue-raising capacity is far weaker than the federal govern-
ment’s.  In sum, contrary to the democratic experimentalists’ implicit 
assumption that decentralized problem-solving will flourish on the ba-
sis of shared values, it is precisely the lack of such values that drives 
the decentralization of antipoverty policy. 
and under-provide services in ways that leave hundreds of thousands of individuals ma-
terially far worse off than even a fiscally conservative Congress might have intended.”). 
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Results-oriented humanitarians, provider groups, and instrumen-
talists, on the other hand, may prefer centralized policymaking be-
cause it offers the greatest return on advocacy efforts invested and be-
cause policymakers on that level have access to superior data and 
analytical resources.  To reach compromises with economic con-
servatives, however, they must ensure the nonparticipation of ex-
pressivists on both wings, who often try to shame their more moderate 
colleagues out of such compromises.  In-kind programs, and cash 
programs for relatively sympathetic populations, have less expressive 
potential, making them superior candidates for pragmatic consensus.  In 
addition, most non-cash benefits are of little interest to middle-income 
people which assures little involvement from social insurers or redistribu-
tionists, either of whom might scare off pragmatic conservatives. 
During sharp swings to the right, like those after the 1980 and 
1994 elections, right-wing expressivists see sufficient opportunities to 
justify reentering national policymaking.  Expressivists on the left, by 
contrast, have great difficulty seizing transitory political opportunities.  
Their number includes many proceduralists who are opposed to an 
elite’s rapid formulation of a program.  Even within substantive ex-
pressivists, divisions about what message to enact, and the desire to 
take on the symbolic challenge of cash assistance, hampers timely 
formulation of proposals to respond to moments of heightened public 
sympathy.
This suggests a discontinuity in the politics of antipoverty pro-
grams, with the positions of those programs’ opponents responding to 
the scale of proposed changes far more than their supporters.  Small 
cuts may be politically infeasible because programs’ supporters will re-
act angrily to the symbolism while the proceeds are insufficient to 
purchase significant support from fiscal conservatives or other interest 
groups.  Because they are not personally affected, however, those sup-
porters may not react much more intensely to proposed cuts large 
enough to fund meaningful advances in some other group’s agenda.  
When antipoverty programs are reduced incrementally, it is generally 
through design features that allow those cuts to occur passively (e.g., a 
failure to adjust for inflation or the failure to increase an appropria-
tion to respond to increased need during recessions).306
306 Super, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 14, at 2629-40. 
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III. CONSTRUCTING A SUBSTANTIVE CONSENSUS IN ANTIPOVERTY LAW
Scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize that the decen-
tralized, experimentalist model’s key assumptions are not met.  Presi-
dent Reagan’s success waging war on mythical “welfare queens” shat-
tered the faith many had in widely shared benevolent norms toward 
the poor and in policymakers’ openness to serious debate based on 
verifiable data.  The 1996 welfare law’s dismantlement of AFDC, along 
with its gratuitous cuts in food stamps and aid to impoverished legal 
immigrants, further demonstrated the depth of the dissensus on basic 
values.  Moreover, conservatives’ successes in setting major substantive 
policies have not warmed many of them to deliberative decision mak-
ing in the implementation of those policies.  Some continue to equate 
fair hearings with obstruction of behavioral requirements and obfus-
cation of the moral messages those requirements seek to convey.307
The catastrophe of Hurricane Katrina, however, eliminated all 
meaningful doubt.  The destitution of 100,000 New Orleans residents, 
and tens of thousands of others across the Gulf Coast, showed the ab-
ject failure of the system of antipoverty law constructed over the last 
forty years.  Whether due to state and local governments’ lack of ca-
pacity, their lack of desire, or deliberative delay, devolving primary re-
sponsibility for fighting poverty to them left vast numbers of people 
too poor to flee a clearly predicted devastating storm.  And in 
Katrina’s aftermath, “the incomplete and ambiguous . . . specification 
of means and ends”308 that the democratic experimentalists celebrate 
left sincere opponents of poverty at all points on the political spec-
trum without a ready response and paralyzed the political process un-
til the opportunity had passed.  Even Cass Sunstein a committed advo-
cate of deliberative policy formulation, recognizes the need for “an 
agreed-upon background.”309  This background was fatally lacking. 
Whenever a structure or a machine suffers a catastrophic failure, 
one of the first questions that engineers must answer is which compo-
nents were to blame and which can continue to function effectively in 
the future.  The same is true of a legal system that fails catastrophically 
to serve the purpose for which it was created.  Thus, although many 
facets of tort law were discarded when they proved impediments to 
industrialization, others remained.  Similarly, although the Court 
307 NANCY L. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 272, at 27. 
308 Dorf & Sabel, Treatment Courts, supra note 101, at 834. 
309 SUNSTEIN, supra note 10, at x. 
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abandoned several constitutional doctrines after 1937, it continued or 
retasked others.  In the same vein, the basic challenge for scholars in 
the wake of these twin catastrophic failures of our antipoverty lawmak-
ing system is to identify which aspects of that system to abandon and 
which elements can perform important functions in a new, viable 
model.
A successful model must offer a substantive policy vision that can 
galvanize as many groups of altruistic antipoverty advocates as possible 
without goading them into divisive, and therefore doomed, absolut-
ism.  It must offer prospects of identifiable results that will tamp down 
fatalism about poverty.  At the same time, it must reduce information 
costs for altruistic supporters of antipoverty programs.  A successful 
model will position antipoverty advocates to regularly exploit oppor-
tunities to improve those programs, such as those following Katrina, 
while not giving critics obvious targets in more difficult political cli-
mates.  And it must offer enough to moderate liberals and moderate 
conservatives that they will expend the political capital to resist ex-
pressivists’ radicalizing pressures. 
Abandoning the substantive indeterminacy of democratic experi-
mentalism, however, does not mean that the opposite extreme—a 
grand unified plan—is the answer.  Each side’s dogged clinging to 
one plan or another, in the absence of the sweeping political consen-
sus needed to enact it, is much of what drove antipoverty law to its ver-
sion of democratic experimentalism.  Thus, as much as one might 
wish to declare that “[t]he time to end poverty has arrived,”310 the po-
litical will to do so has not. 
A narrower consensus is possible, however, on measures that 
would make a real difference in low-income peoples’ lives.  This plea 
is, in essence, a call to recognize and emphasize the strand of central-
ized, bipartisan antipoverty policymaking that has continued in the 
shadows of more prominent deliberations, most of them decentral-
ized and experimental, about grand solutions. 
This Part explores the potential for a partial but significant sub-
stantive consensus on improving antipoverty law.  Section A examines 
the politics of assembling such a consensus, while Section B addresses 
what substantively antipoverty activists can hope to accomplish. 
310 JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR
TIME 364 (2005). 
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A.  The Politics of a More Robust Substantive Antipoverty Consensus 
Although the vast majority of federal policymaking on secondary 
antipoverty programs over the past four decades has been bipartisan, 
negotiations can founder unless the participants have some sense of 
what the default result is likely to be in the absence of a deal.  Regard-
less of whether action is ultimately largely partisan or fully bipartisan, 
conscientious actors in both parties still need to consider how to ap-
peal to a range of political perspectives.  Even partisan proposals can 
win fairly easy enactment if they avoid positions anathematic to broad 
segments of the other party.  This again requires disaggregating both 
the Right and the Left. 
Many prominent economic conservatives do not question the ba-
sic concept of public aid for low-income people.311  To the contrary, 
they argue that private charities cannot perform this role effectively 
because of free-rider problems:  the benefits of relieving poverty flow 
to members of society whether or not they contribute.312  Savvy eco-
nomic conservatives also recognize that Americans’ anti-ideological 
strain prevents them from seeing rigid laissez-faire doctrine as a satis-
factory justification for ignoring people in distress.313  A key to enlist-
ing their support is to design programs that minimize distortions on 
the economy and on individuals’ incentives.  For example, President 
Bush and leading conservative Republican senators supported sub-
stantial increases in food stamps in 2002 as a means of diverting funds 
from trade-distorting agricultural subsidies.314
Likewise, fiscal conservatives should not present an insuperable 
obstacle.  Meaningful antipoverty initiatives are possible at costs that 
are quite modest relative to the budget as a whole.  Mandatory in-
come-security programs—including some with large components not 
limited to low-income people—will consume just 6.6% of federal 
311 See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, supra note 301 at 109. 
312 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191 (1962) (“It can be ar-
gued that private charity is insufficient because the benefits from it accrue to people 
other than those who make the gifts . . . .”); see also MUELLER, supra note 235, at 47-49 
(finding that voluntary associations may lead to free-riding and less than Pareto-
optimal redistribution). 
313 See CONLAN, supra note 96, at 315 (finding that most American voters who self-
identify as being ideological conservatives are also “operational liberals” in that they 
support major public programs); Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2075-76 (find-
ing divergence between conservatives and the electorate on responding to innocent 
misfortune).
314 Super, Quiet Revolution, supra note 239, at 1383 n.480. 
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spending within the next decade.315 Doubling these programs—far 
more than is politically plausible—nonetheless would have just 63% of 
the cost of extending President Bush’s tax cuts over this period.316
Those conservatives most committed to using antipoverty law for 
expressive purposes—the “New Moralizers”317—and those seeing it as 
a potential partisan wedge to split the Democratic coalition are 
unlikely to join in any meaningful antipoverty initiatives.  Given the 
low saliency that antipoverty policy has in normal times, and the dan-
gers those groups would face opposing initiatives in conditions like 
those that followed Katrina, their reservations need not be determi-
native.  Even as partisan a Republican as Newt Gingrich declared that 
declining welfare caseloads “didn’t end poverty in America,” requir-
ing further initiatives “to help those still left out of the American 
dream.”318
Similarly, a new antipoverty agenda could count on support from 
many, but by no means all, liberals.  Low-income people themselves 
would naturally benefit from these initiatives.  Fully engaged low-
income advocates have strong reasons to be pragmatic.  Humanitari-
ans, liberal as well as conservative, should be the core constituency for 
antipoverty law.  Many instrumentalists, particularly those with objec-
tions to harsher means of achieving their goals, should support anti-
poverty initiatives. 
Highly partisan Democrats, on the other hand, are unlikely to find 
an antipoverty initiative that the general public strongly supports but 
that Republicans do not.  Redistributionists likely could not be ac-
commodated in the same coalition with economic conservatives,319
and the latter are far more numerous and important.  And those lib-
erals wishing to deliver expressive messages through antipoverty law 
would bring more controversy than support.  Fortunately, like conser-
vative expressivists, such liberals have many other vehicles for achiev-
ing the symbolic statements they seek. 
315 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 
2008 TO 2018, at 52 tbl.3-1, 56 tbl.3-3 (2008). 
316 Id. at 106.  The cost of doubling income-support programs in the final year of 
this period would consume less than forty-five percent of the cost of the expiring tax 
cuts that year.
317 Super, New Moralizers, supra note 9, at 2053-57 (criticizing some expressive laws). 
318 Cochran, supra note 283, at 2809. 
319 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 195 (“One cannot be both an egalitarian . . . 
and a [classical] liberal.”). 
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Beyond maintaining significant elite support on both sides of the 
ideological divide, the success of significant antipoverty initiatives de-
pends on broad appeals to public opinion.  Absent the ability to mobi-
lize strong public support, antipoverty programs will remain vulner-
able to raids for other priorities and to partisans in search of “wedge 
issues,” as both occurred in the early 1980s and mid-1990s.  Instru-
mental arguments, however, tend to be too complex to engage a dis-
tractible electorate:  the information costs required to confirm or re-
ject them are too great.  Successful appeals to the public must be 
humanitarian. 
Such an appeal is feasible.  For example, few plausible instrumen-
tal arguments exist for disaster relief—indeed, instrumental argu-
ments will tend to favor aid to businesses in the affected region rather 
than to individual disaster victims.  Yet the response to Hurricane 
Katrina shows that humanitarian appeals can work:  the electorate had 
no problem with people in New Orleans feeling a sense of entitlement 
to aid from the government while in a crisis.  Attempts to blame the 
victims in New Orleans failed:  the public was not convinced that those 
not evacuating did anything wrong, and felt that even if they did this 
was far more harm than most of the public was willing to see visited 
upon even the “unworthy poor.”  Despite widespread resistance to 
providing cash assistance to low-income people, FEMA, after it was 
embarrassed, announced that it would give debit cards worth $2,000 
each to displaced families. 
Winning and maintaining public support requires transparency.  
Few voters will bear many information costs in developing antipoverty 
policy.  Journalistic attention to, and effectiveness in explaining, pov-
erty issues is intermittent.  Some liberal and conservative elites are 
likely to criticize any initiative; if the public cannot readily judge the 
merits of that criticism, it will become frozen in ambivalence.  Trans-
parency is also crucial in holding together a coalition that crosses 
ideological lines:  each side will show more trust if it expects that the 
public would recognize any breach by the other. 
The public cannot be expected to maintain continuous interest in 
the way necessary to enact several successive initiatives. This counsels 
in favor of designing initiatives that make sense in their own terms, 
rather than small programs designed to lead to something larger.  
Moreover, a constant drumbeat of stories about poverty can convince 
the public that the problem is insoluble.  Indeed, because many initia-
tives may take some time to show results, intermittent public attention 
to poverty may reduce the risk of impatience.  As a result, progress 
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depends significantly on capturing rare moments of intense public 
sympathy for low-income people to achieve major improvements. 
B.  Elements of a Plausible Antipoverty Consensus 
Whatever the shortcomings of in-kind benefits, U.S. public opin-
ion remains profoundly hostile to providing cash assistance under 
most circumstances to most groups of low-income people.  Any broad 
initiatives involving cash assistance would also draw in expressivists on 
both the Left and the Right, hindering pragmatic agreement.  Includ-
ing cash assistance programs would also eliminate any chance of draw-
ing support from provider groups, as recipients spend cash aid on a 
range of needs. 
In addition, although the public would support more generous as-
sistance than this country now offers, overbroad guarantees will draw 
attacks for destroying work incentives and creating moral hazard.320
Once the safety net gets beyond a certain point, these arguments be-
come difficult to deflect.  A new body of research suggests that fami-
lies receiving somewhat more generous public benefits respond to 
work incentives better than the absolutely destitute.321  This makes 
sense on several levels.  Having one’s life in utter chaos can lead to 
panic or depression, both of which impair rational thinking.  Destitu-
tion also radically shortens an individual’s time horizon:  a mother with 
no way to feed her hungry children today may prefer a $4 per hour off-
the-books job that pays cash right away to a permanent job paying twice 
that but requiring her to wait two weeks for her first paycheck. 
A key feature of a sustainable antipoverty strategy is reliance on 
fewer, better programs.  This feature directly opposes the instincts of 
liberal experimentalists, who have sought to create numerous small 
programs in the hope that some will yield sufficiently appealing results 
to build support for more funding.322  Multiplying programs, however, 
wreaks havoc with transparency and accountability.  Senior policy-
makers, and the electorate, cannot tell the difference between a pro-
gram that is having little impact because its funding is insufficient to 
320 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 24-27 (1992) (arguing that guaranteed shelter would 
weaken work incentives and reduce aggregate social welfare). 
321 See CYNTHIA MILLER, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., EXPLAIN-
ING THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM’S IMPACTS BY HOUSING STATUS 1 
(1998) (finding that almost all positive impacts of an incentive-laden welfare experi-
ment occurred among recipients in subsidized housing). 
322 Super, Political Economy, supra note 242, at 723-25. 
608 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 541
provide a meaningful benefit or to serve enough people, and one with 
a bad design.  Supporters tend to overpromise; the failure to redeem 
these promises persuades the public that government cannot affect 
poverty.  Journalists and the public also cannot evaluate how much 
help people get when numerous small programs are serving small 
numbers of people; they tend to assume that all programs are avail-
able to everyone, grossly overstating the aid provided and creating the 
sense that little more is needed.323  The costs of acquiring more accu-
rate information, though not huge, are more than most reporters or 
voters will bear. 
Thoughtful conservatives have long advocated for reducing the 
number of programs as a way of minimizing administrative costs.324
With resources concentrated on a few programs, those programs can 
be designed as responsive entitlements (serving all eligible claimants 
without artificial caps325) and functional entitlements (defining their 
benefits in terms of the amount necessary to accomplish a particular 
purpose rather than as an arbitrary sum that may not make a measur-
able difference and that may prove vulnerable to inflation and budget 
cuts).326  Developing common programs applicable to all low-income 
people, regardless of age, health, or family arrangement, would pro-
mote simplicity, transparency, and equity.  As a leading economic con-
servative has argued, a sound antipoverty program “should be de-
signed to help people as people not as members of particular 
occupational groups or age groups.”327
Beyond that, the contours of a plausible antipoverty policy draw 
much from the substantive component of the new governance.  To re-
tain economic conservatives’ support, antipoverty policies must mini-
mize market distortions328 by paying close attention to incentives.329
This minimization can avoid much of the bureaucracy required to op-
erate command-and-control regulation.  Creating incentives also of-
323 See id. at 696-705 (describing problems in evaluating a program’s effectiveness). 
324 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 192-93 (advocating tax breaks “as a substi-
tute for the present rag bag of measures” to reduce the total administrative burden). 
325 See Super, Political Economy, supra note 242, at 654-55 (explaining responsive 
entitlements).
326 See id. at 655-58 (describing functional entitlements). 
327 FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 191. 
328 Id.
329 See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand:  The Rise of the Personal Choice 
Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 836-44 (2004) (cataloguing the in-
creasingly varied and complex ways in which public benefit programs manipulate 
claimants’ incentives). 
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fers a compromise on values important to one faction of the coalition 
but disputed by others.330  Thus, for example, eliminating rules that 
deny or limit eligibility to married people can win broader support 
than either preserving those rules or imposing explicit marriage-
promotion efforts.  Programs that reduce benefits too sharply as re-
cipients’ income rises will be unsustainable. 
Although the ultimate market-based form of assistance—cash—is 
anathema to much of the electorate, the government’s role should be 
limited to financing goods as opposed to directly purchasing or even 
producing them.  This will enhance support among economic conser-
vatives,331 expand low-income recipients’ ability to meet their prefer-
ences, and provide more effective quality control than command-and-
control regulation.  Thus, antipoverty advocates should favor pro-
grams such as food stamps, Section 8 housing vouchers, and fee-for-
service Medicaid over commodity distribution, project-based Section 
8, and Medicaid-managed care, which in turn are preferable to soup 
kitchens, public-housing projects, and free clinics. 
To secure economic conservatives’ support for a coherent system 
of public benefits, liberals should be prepared to substitute transfers 
for regulatory redistributions.332  Economic conservatives attack mini-
mum-wage laws as inefficient because they distort the market, they risk 
eliminating low-skilled jobs, and their class of beneficiaries maps badly 
onto that of low-income people.333  Some minimum-wage law would 
still be needed as a backstop against grossly coercive employment con-
tracts, but liberals should be receptive to improving low-wage workers’ 
well-being through transfer payments rather than increases in the real 
value of the minimum wage.  Similarly, responding to the effects of 
globalization with public benefits rather than trade limitations could 
appeal to economic conservatives while targeting aid at those most in 
need.  The relative prevalence of regulatory redistributions at the lo-
cal level gives economic conservatives an incentive to support moving 
330 See id., at 842-44 (noting that moving from command-and-control rules to in-
centives requires accepting that some disfavored behavior will continue). 
331 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 178-80 (arguing the merits of cash grants 
over public housing programs). 
332 Professors Kaplow and Shavell find manipulation of legal rules inferior to trans-
fer payments as a means of redistributing income due to one kind of under-
inclusiveness:  the failure of any given rule to help low-income people not coming in 
contact with that portion of the legal system.  LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIR-
NESS VERSUS WELFARE 33-34 (2002).  Each legal rule manipulated to this end creates 
additional inefficiencies. 
333 FRIEDMAN, supra note 312, at 180-81. 
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the locus of antipoverty policymaking to the national level.  Thus, 
economic conservatives’ antipathy for local regulatory redistribution 
should align their interests with those fiscally sophisticated supporters 
of antipoverty programs, who recognize that affluent people’s mobil-
ity, and the cyclical vulnerability of local tax bases, are likely to doom 
significant local transfer programs.334
IV. WHITHER DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTALISM?
Democratic experimentalism’s potential for success depends heav-
ily on several assumptions unlikely to be met in a wide range of cir-
cumstances.  Under less-than-ideal conditions, it can impede and dis-
tort public action rather than unleash and inform it.  Moreover, it 
remains highly vulnerable to commandeering by its philosophical op-
ponents.  Even the welfare-rights movement’s relatively brief appear-
ance in the late 1960s transformed the norms underlying participation 
in antipoverty policymaking from the deliberative ones implicit in 
democratic experimentalism to those of interest-group competition.  
No doubt a great deal of public-spirited deliberation has taken place 
since, but from that time forth the two approaches to participation 
have co-existed without clear delineation.  In addition, the norm of 
deliberation proved wholly insufficient to blunt the expressivist 
Right’s drive to slash and dismantle antipoverty programs, both in 
1981 and even more sweepingly in 1996.  Whether these cuts are seen 
as the result of interest-group democracy or elite decision making, 
they reflect focused, centralized decisions strikingly insensitive to the 
cause of fighting poverty.  In 1996, deliberative, decentralized ex-
perimentalism not only failed to prevent the cuts but provided an ef-
fective political smokescreen.  And in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
its dogged indeterminacy produced a political calamity that com-
pounded the physical one. 
This Part uses antipoverty law’s experiences to seek insight into 
the future of democratic experimentalism.  Section A considers the 
broader applicability of that experience.  Section B explores options 
for modifying democratic experimentalism. 
334 See MUELLER, supra note 235, at 677 (noting the ultimate ineffectiveness of re-
distribution at a local level due to people’s ability to “vote with their feet”). 
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A.  The Value of the Antipoverty Law Example 
The past four decades of the decentralized system for antipoverty 
policy formation have been so dismal that few would want to claim 
that history.  Democratic experimentalists can argue legitimately that 
this system did not operate in full conformity with their prescriptions:  
among other things, participants on both ideological wings elevated 
symbolic victories over pragmatic accomplishment.  To their credit, 
democratic experimentalists have recognized the 1996 welfare law’s 
cynicism,335 while many others have not. 
Nonetheless, when a regime espouses most of the ex-
perimentalists’ core precepts—decentralization, deregulation, delib-
eration, and learning from the results of local experiments—it is no 
answer to say that the regime got it wrong when the experimentalists 
propose no mechanism for preventing such expropriation of their 
ideas or for correcting such errors.  It would be anomalous for a re-
gime defined as experimentalist to countenance only successful ef-
forts.  Experimentalists must accept and learn from failures as much 
as triumphs.  And with the literature dominated to date by the democ-
ratic experimentalists’ hand-picked anecdotes of promise, an analysis 
of some of these techniques’ failures is crucial to assessing democratic 
experimentalism’s true potential and any appropriate modifications of 
its terms.  Just as leading democratic experimentalists criticize institu-
tional approaches whose “successes [a]re limited to unusual con-
texts,”336 their prescriptions’ value depends on their breadth and reli-
ability of application. 
Moreover, the democratic experimentalists themselves rely heavily 
on examples that depart significantly from the decentralized model 
they espouse.  They tout drug treatment courts as a major example of 
experimentalist governance, deeming them “an outgrowth of a series 
of grass-roots initiatives that emphasized similarly community-based 
team-oriented approaches.”337  The federal role they describe is one of 
collecting and diffusing information.  Local initiatives and in-
formation sharing undoubtedly played an important role in spreading 
drug-treatment courts.  So, however, did some very centralized, coer-
335 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 434-38 (calling the 1996 welfare law “the evil 
twin” of positive experimentalist legislation); Lobel, Renew Deal, supra note 21, at 459 
(noting that the 1996 welfare law disguised what is merely a reduction in benefits as 
government experimentation). 
336 Dorf & Sabel, Treatment Courts, supra note 101, at 835. 
337 Id. at 843. 
612 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 541
cive methods:  a public defender in the first drug-treatment court was 
the incoming President’s brother-in-law, who urged both using federal 
financial leverage to establish those courts nationally and appointing 
the first court’s founder (Janet Reno) as attorney general.338  Facing 
severe, chronic shortages of funds for drug-treatment programs, if the 
only way a community could get federal treatment money was by start-
ing a drug-treatment court, it is not surprising that hundreds of des-
perate communities did so.  We will never know how communities 
would have responded to a true experimentalist approach, in which 
federal treatment funds were available on equal terms to communities 
responding to drug abuse through other models:  perhaps some of 
those other models would have proven superior to drug courts.  
Evaluating the effectiveness of these courts is also problematic;339 al-
though exponents celebrate lower recidivism rates among those sub-
jected to drug-treatment courts, the courts are designed to serve less se-
rious offenders who would be expected to succeed more in any event. 
B. The Future of Democratic Experimentalism 
One possible course for the democratic experimentalists is to look 
for areas of government responsibility where their implicit assump-
tions are met, and where key actors might be expected to support its 
establishment.  This would exclude “conflicts of economic interest” 
and “disputes over rights arising from moral differences” but leave 
some of the third area that they assert is ripe for experimentalism:  
“the provision of public services.”340  Efficient solid-waste disposal sys-
tems, for example, probably enjoy consensus support, can be meas-
ured with relative reliability, do not involve particularly time-sensitive 
decisions, and are appropriately organized at the local level.341  No 
group has an obvious motive to organize a deliberative, ex-
perimentalist approach to designing such systems, but neither does 
338 Mary Wisniewski, Courts Get a Fix on Drug Treatment Alternatives in Low-Level Drug 
Cases, CHI. LAWYER, June 1999, at 6-7. 
339 U.S. GAO, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RE-
SULTS 8 (1997) (failing to come to any definitive conclusions on the impact of drug-
court programs). 
340 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 12, at 284. 
341 Participation in deliberations about solid-waste disposal still will have signifi-
cant cost.  Absent a crisis, few are likely to care enough about these issues to spend 
time on them.  The same is likely true of most issues on which broad substantive con-
sensus exists.  On the other hand, at least persons wishing to participate in delibera-
tions over solid-waste disposal need not acquire specialized technical knowledge. 
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any have a reason to oppose them.  Here, however, the new govern-
ance’s procedural side may run into conflict with its substantive com-
ponent.  Many of the areas in which we have consensus concerning 
the nature of the problem, the importance of taking action, the mea-
sure of success, and the wisdom of decentralization are precisely those 
subject to the strongest demands for privatization.  Even frequent crit-
ics of privatization may not object to turning over many of these func-
tions to the private sector.342
Another option would be to relax considerably democratic ex-
perimentalism’s prescriptions.  A thinner democratic experimental-
ism—for example, one that did not disparage individual rights or con-
fine courts to a purely procedural role—could contribute 
constructively to policymaking in some environments in which the 
pure version likely would misfire.  Orly Lobel’s thoughtful work could 
be seen as a move in this direction.  Legal rules could create incen-
tives for deliberative approaches in these areas.  To some extent, ad-
ministrative law already does this.  Even when statutes do not require 
agencies to pursue deliberative decision-making processes, they re-
ceive far more judicial deference when they do.343
CONCLUSION
Contemporary debates about deliberative democracy have grap-
pled with the very problems that democratic experimentalism assumes 
away.  For example, far from assuming consensus on the normative 
character of policy problems and the appropriate scope of govern-
ment intervention, many deliberative democrats’ major focus is on 
how we can manage normative conflicts.344  They understand that de-
342 See Super, Privatization, supra note 304, at 414-27 (objecting to privatization of 
functions implicating contested normative choices and those whose performance gov-
ernment cannot readily monitor). 
343 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (identifying a “category 
of interpretive choices distinguished by an additional reason for judicial deference” as 
those in which the agency used participatory decision-making procedures). 
344 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
10 (2004) (“The general aim of deliberative democracy is to provide the most justifi-
able conception for dealing with moral disagreement in politics.”); 1 JÜRGEN HABER-
MAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 189-93 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1981) 
(describing means of finding normative commonality across cultural differences); id.
at 19 (discussing the means of converting self-interested dialogue into theoretical 
normative discourse). 
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liberation can easily polarize.345  They are keenly aware that “delibera-
tion can also be used cynically . . . as a cover for the exercise of power 
politics.”346  Critics have demanded a plan for handling those “driven 
by self-interest, blinded by prejudice, or deluded by ideology.”347
More broadly, deliberative democrats argue that “substantive agree-
ment on preferences or values is neither practically realistic nor nor-
matively appealing in a large, pluralist constituency.”348
Debates on deliberative democracy have focused on the sensitivity 
of reliable, transparent metrics for measuring policies’ success.  Public 
communication about causal mechanics may be more manipulable 
than that about purely normative questions.349  Special interests can 
deceive the electorate at least as easily as their lobbyists can capture 
public officials.350  Some regard economic issues as too complex for 
effective deliberation.351
These scholars acknowledge that occasionally time will not allow 
deliberative policymaking.352  Time pressures, among other reasons, 
can necessitate resorting to experts to clarify questions of fact.353  Rec-
345 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 177 
(2002) (stating that “deliberation predictably pushes groups toward a more extreme 
point”). 
346 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 46. 
347 James Johnson, Arguing for Deliberation:  Some Skeptical Considerations, in DELIB-
ERATIVE DEMOCRACY 161, 166 ( Jon Elster ed., 1998). 
348 Id. at 176; see also BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY 
POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 242-44 (1984) (finding that deliberation requires commonal-
ity of norms, but placing much value on autonomy and plurality). 
349 BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 195 (2004) (noting 
that the average citizen may find the bureaucratic system “opaque” but still be engaged 
by policy issues such as global warming); Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 347, at 123, 123 (“Public communication influ-
encing . . . causal beliefs is as important as deliberation over normative matters, and 
perhaps more subject to manipulation.”). 
350 Stokes, supra note 349, at 128 (“[O]rganized interests shaped citizens’ prefer-
ences over policies, and those endogenously formed policy preferences in turn caused 
a shift in government policy . . . .”). 
351 See Daniel A. Bell, Democratic Deliberation: The Problem of Implementation, in DE-
LIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 70, 71-72 (Stephen 
Macedo ed., 1999) (“Many economic issues are so complex that it is difficult for non-
experts to contribute meaningfully to the ‘debate.’”). 
352 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 43 (“The theory of deliberative 
democracy does not always in all circumstances demand the practice of deliberation.”). 
353 See id. at 54 (stating that deliberative groups that “enlist experts to answer ques-
tions and clarify matters of fact” tend to be less polarizing). 
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ognizing that many issues must be addressed nationally, these scholars 
seek the means to make deliberation viable on that scale.354
Acknowledging that substantial costs will deter participation, de-
liberative democrats work to minimize those costs.355  They do this in 
part by limiting their deliberative models to a few key issues.  They are 
particularly concerned with how to preserve legitimacy in light of the 
gross inequalities in wealth that affect parties’ ability to bear par-
ticipatory costs.356  Some scholars note other, non-economic costs to 
deliberation, including stigmatization and loss of a sense of self-worth 
in the low-income community resulting from debates on poverty.357
Debates on deliberative democracy also have focused on the prob-
lem of establishing such a regime.  Skeptics note that deliberative de-
mocrats assume healthy interactions without showing why those are 
likely;358 advocates concede that “politicians are not automatically 
transformed from representatives of special interests into trustees of 
the public interest as a result of talking to one another.”359
Awareness of these limitations has led deliberative democrats to 
make less ambitious claims for their proposals’ applicability than those 
the democratic experimentalists assert.  They “recommend that . . . 
not . . . every political activity itself be deliberative”360 and avoid “mak-
ing a black-and-white claim” about the desirability of their approach.361
And in marked contrast to the democratic experimentalists, leading de-
liberative democrats find respect for individual rights indispensable to 
354 See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 120 (proposing a $150 stipend to 
pay citizens to participate in a national “Deliberation Day”); BARBER, supra note 348, at 
245-48 (“The problem of scale is the problem of communication, and to deal with the 
second is to deal with the first.”). 
355 See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 31 (acknowledging that the 
large number of citizens in modern democracies creates significant participation costs 
in direct democracy). 
356 See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 189-93 (explaining how the intro-
duction of deliberative democracy would add moral weight to political outcomes that 
address income distribution). 
357 See Stokes, supra note 349, at 124, 134-35 (noting the effect public characteriza-
tions of welfare recipients have on the self-image of those recipients). 
358 See Johnson, supra note 347, at 164 (observing that advocates of deliberative 
democracy often fail to meet the exacting standards they apply to those they critique). 
359 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 11. 
360 Id. at 56. 
361  See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 192 (conceding that political out-
comes addressing economic equality may have legitimizing effects for the victorious 
party’s policy, but arguing that they will be more significant in a deliberative democracy). 
616 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 541
the legitimacy of deliberative democracy.362  In particular, they see basic 
economic opportunity as a vital prerequisite to the deliberative proc-
ess.363
Deliberative democrats have not found magical answers to these 
daunting questions.364  Indeed, some argue persuasively that their en-
terprise is fundamentally flawed.365  Nonetheless, the clarity of debates 
over deliberative democracy, and their candid recognition of its limi-
tations, could help produce a better democratic experimentalism. 
362 Id. at 53, 59; BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 314-20 
(1980); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 
347, at 185, 207-21 (“The principle of deliberative inclusion extends naturally from 
religious liberty to a wide guarantee of expressive liberty.”). 
363 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 344, at 142-43 (“When a political system is 
structured to give rich citizens far more political power than is warranted . . . , then 
deliberative processes will suffer.”); see generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS 
AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 83
(William Rehg trans., 1996) (stating that “modern law is especially suited for the social 
integration of economic societies”). 
364 ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note 349, at 189. 
365 Cf. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 151-56 (1999) (rejecting 
the idea espoused by many deliberative theorists that disagreement or lack of consen-
sus is necessarily indicative of a failure of the deliberative system). 
